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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
On 28-29 November 2007, experts from the United States and the Russian Federation met in 
Washington, DC to discuss the current state of bilateral relations and opportunities and obstacles 
for mitigating downward trends.  Sponsored by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 
(ASCO) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Committee on International Security and 
Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academies, the Foundation for Military Reform in 
Moscow, and the Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
this two-day discussion was structured to identify specific areas for bilateral research and 
discussion in 2008 and 2009. 
 
The overriding issue that permeated the presentations and the discussion sessions was 
“perceptions and misperceptions.”  In many aspects, the United States and Russia have similar 
security concerns and the potential for deliberate hostilities between the two countries was 
considered nonexistent.  However, the uncertainty surrounding strategic modernization and 
nuclear doctrines and postures highlighted a legacy Cold War mindset of mistrust between the 
United States and Russia.  Among the recommended areas for dialogue and perception 
management were:     
• The creation of a glossary of common terms and concepts related to strategic planning 
and doctrines.  Included in this dialogue would be bilateral concepts for alert postures and 
what they really mean in practical and operational terms, to include dispelling the notion 
of “hair-trigger” alerts.  Capabilities-based planning would also fall within this joint 
analysis since the Russian translation “to develop maximum capabilities in every area” 
creates a significant perception management concern. 
• Deterrence and what deters is the 21st century is a significant theme for both the United 
States and Russia as they both assess the utility and application of their strategic 
capabilities.  Moreover, workshop participants agreed that having a foreign perspective 
on these issues would aid each country since the effectiveness of deterrence is based on 
external perceptions. 
• Ballistic missile defense in Europe emerged as an important political and symbolic theme 
during the workshop.  Russian participants emphasized the perception that the United 
States was showing a lack of respect for the Russian Federation by attempting to push 
forward with the BMD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic without giving adequate 
consideration for Russian views.  According to the Russian experts, the BMD system did 
have a limited capability against Russian systems and though this would have a 
negligible impact on the overall Russian deterrent, the unwillingness of the United States 
to acknowledge this limited capability was considered a diplomatic snub.  Moreover, 
several of the Russian presenters underscored that a joint U.S.-Russian BMD capability 
in Europe would improve bilateral relations and overall system effectiveness based on 
both the technical enhancements as well as the important symbolic value of a joint 
defense against Iran and other emerging threats.  Among the short-term opportunities for 
overcoming the bilateral impasse on BMD were the recommendations for joint analysis 
on threats, a follow-up to the 2005 joint tabletop exercise on ballistic missile defense 
against third-party actors, and a joint study on information exchange requirements during 
BMD operations. 
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• Understanding NPT Article 6 commitments and obligations within the 21st century risk 
environment was another significant and recurring theme during the workshop.  
Participants explored the possibility of creating a bilateral study group to look at the 
original intention of the NPT and the global risk environment at that time and whether 
these timelines and obligations were being adequately met through unilateral reductions.  
Included in this analysis would be a discussion of whether a perceived emphasis on 
nuclear weapons in national strategies undermines NPT obligations?  Finally, existing 
rules and guidelines for the regimes and agreements that support the NPT were 
considered inadequate for international coordination and cooperation in the 21st century 
and thus in need of some revision. 
• U.S. and Russian international leadership emerged as a significant area for further 
exploration.  Cooperation in nuclear forensics and attribution; establishing new “rules of 
the game” for nuclear states that do not have a history with arms control (especially 
China and India); the enhancement of a security culture around the world – especially in 
light of the expansion of the civilian nuclear energy sector; and anticipation of and rapid 
response to the next “proliferation shock” were all areas considered ripe for joint analysis 
and coordination. 
• Finally, it was emphasized that significant U.S. and Russian cooperation is occurring on a 
daily basis but these important bilateral efforts are often not appreciated for their 
significance.  The continued success and transformation of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program, to include biological threat and hazard reduction; the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI); the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP); and tremendous reductions in strategic arsenal sizes all highlight bilateral 
cooperation in very sensitive areas.  Leveraging and building upon these existing efforts 
could provide a natural means for enhancing overall bilateral relations. 
 
The following pages provide a summary of the 28-29 November 2007 workshop.  In light of 
upcoming presidential elections in both countries and the current political state of U.S.-Russian 
relations, the primarily recommendation to emerge from this joint dialogue was the need to take 
small, deliberate steps as the most appropriate means for setting a course for long-term progress 
and success in U.S.-Russian relations. 
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U.S.-Russian Dialogue on Strategic Cooperation and Joint Crisis Management 




Ms. Anne Harrington: This meeting is being held on the heels of a recent National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS)-Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) meeting in Vienna on “The Future 
Nuclear Security Environment in 2015.”  The goal of that effort is to project forward in terms of 
threats as well as the potential for cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in/around 2015. 
The first two speakers today will provide comments from that meeting as both were participants.  
I’ll also note that one of the suggestions to come out of Vienna was the need for a standing/ 
sustained structure for exploring these issues and this meeting/group is therefore supporting that 
goal. 
 
Dr. Michael Wheeler: This meeting is the latest round of U.S.-Russian cooperative discussions 
sponsored by the Advance Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA).  The focus of these discussions has been to explore in an unofficial 
capacity critical and emerging issues between the two countries.  Some framing remarks: 
 
• Almost exactly six years ago a joint statement on a new US-Russian relationship was 
signed by both presidents [reads portions of the statement].2  We meet at a time when the 
nature of the special new relationship is under stress.  There are many levels where this 
can be explored and this type of forum allows informal participation by USG officials 
• On 13 Oct 2007, Secretary Gates provided some comments in Moscow.  He referenced 
his time as an arms control analyst during the Cold War.  Gates quote (paraphrased): 
“While historians can debate whether arms control reduced the size of each country’s 
arsenal, the dialogue made major contributions to reducing misunderstanding and 
miscalculations [between the two countries].” 
• Pat Harahan, DTRA historian, recently attended a very interesting meeting at the State 
Department and has a CD with declassified U.S. and Soviet materials from their 
negotiations during the Cold War. 
• Secretary Rice has stated that she fully believes we cannot work with each other unless 
we have an appreciation for each other’s history and perspectives.  It is unprecedented to 
have serving Secretaries of Defense and State who have spent much of their careers as 
Soviet/Russian analysts. 
• As the custodians of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, the responsibility is significant 
and unique that the U.S. and Russia have in the international arena. 
 
                                                
1 These proceedings capture the main elements of the two-day dialogue between the U.S. and Russian experts listed 
in Appendix B.  Where available, speaker notes and presentations are used to augment this document.  All Russian 
presentations and comments except those delivered by Dr. Rogov were conducted in Russian with simultaneous 
interpretation into English provided.            
2 The joint statement on A New Relationship Between the United States and Russia can be found out: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-4.html 
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Dr. Sergei Rogov: As a long-term veteran of CISAC events, I am very happy to be here. I’m 
very much impressed by the agenda we’re going to discuss today and tomorrow.  Since the end 
of the Cold War, we have felt like we need to discuss new issues and nuclear policies are not 
normally a part of this new agenda.  It seems to me that we’re entering a very dangerous period 
in international history.  We’re already entering a post-Iraq international situation; not sure when 
it [Iraq] will end but the world is certainly going to be different.   
Going back to the “old issue” of multi-polarity where a number of players are influencing the 
international system.  The U.S. is still number one, but others are also superpowers (but not 
necessarily in a military sense).  There are three major differences, however, from the old 
concept of multi-polarity: 
1. Multi-polarity was historically Western based/Western culture.  Now a significant Asian 
component (especially China and India); 
2. Never before have all the major players had nuclear weapons; imagine Stalin, Hitler, etc 
having nuclear weapons in the 1930’s….; and 
3. We feel there is a lack of common accepted rules of the games.  We sense a weakness of 
international institutions to manage this new multi-polarity.  There is a need to establish 
new “rules of the game” and Russia has a role.  Russia is not a superpower, but you must 
agree it is a major player.  We need rules for engaging not just each other but also the 
PRC and India and others who have never had to engage this way in the international 
system.  So we should prevent the total elimination of the arms control framework 




Dr. Michael Wheeler and Ms. Anne Harrington provide opening comments. 
Panel 1: The Evolving US and Russian Security Environments: 
Mutual Interests, Mutual Perceptions, and Pressing Challenges 
Presentation – U.S. speaker: An overview of “The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 
2015” workshop held in Vienna on 12-13 November 2007. 
This was the third in a series of discussions sponsored by the U.S. National Academies and the 
Russian Academy of Sciences.  There was a clear emphasis on evolving our security relationship 
from assistance to a true partnership.  The meeting did not seek consensus but rather the 
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promotion of an ongoing, continuing dialogue and continuing this dialogue at all levels.  Subjects 
discussed included: 
- MPC&A 
- NK and proliferation concerns 
- Nuclear terrorism 
 
Plenty of ideas exist; the challenge is to implement these ideas. Amb. Brooks’ recommendation 
at the end of the Vienna meeting was that small victories may be the key to success [in 
advancing U.S.-Russian cooperation] since large efforts could lead to failure after large 
investments and effort have been made. 
 
A similar outreach effort is underway by CISAC with the Chinese Academy and they have 
shown interest in having trilateral discussions (US-RF-PRC). 
 
Why 2015 for the workshop timeline? 
- Bratislava Initiative will have ended 
- U.S. assistance for nuclear MPC&A will have ended (2013).  Note, however, that a new 
GAO report is out that is very positive on improvements since the last GAO report. 
- Both countries will have had new presidential and parliamentary elections 
- We are in period of convergence on nuclear security and proliferation and terrorism 
- World-wide renaissance on nuclear energy is underway 
 
A Vision of 2015 / The key elements of the ideal future = global leadership through a strong 
Russian-American partnership  
– Rough parity and continued nuclear arms reductions 
– Better transparency 
– Shared commitment to MPC&A 
– Successful nonproliferation initiatives (Iran/DPRK) 
– Non-military use of HEU ended 
– Full compliance with UN Resolution 1540 
– Stronger forensics/attribution 
 
Barriers to cooperation: 
- Mutual suspicion 
- U.S. perception that RF shifting toward authoritarianism and away from pluralism 
- RF perception that U.S. abandoning arms control regimes that provided predictability 
- NATO expansion 
- European missile defense 
 
NPT concerns: 
- Need for serious Article 6 discussions, to include what it truly means 
- How to make withdrawal from NPT more difficult while retaining benefits of nuclear 
development 
- Expansion of nuclear energy per Article 4 
- Adoption of IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT States (meeting held in Vienna, so 
IAEA presented this concept during the workshop) 
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Key considerations: 
- What can we learn from our successes? Kola Technical and Training Center an example. 
- What role should IAEA play?  What role will U.S. and Russia play in the IAEA? 
- Future of US/RF 123 Agreement (a small part of the Vienna discussion) 
- Evolution of GNEP (a lot of discussion in Vienna on this) 
 
Way ahead: 
- Demonstrate US/Russia leadership through partnership in: 
o Nonproliferation 
o Nuclear energy 
o Preventing nuclear terrorism 
o Scientific cooperation in support of partnership 
- More active engagement of the NAS/RAS CISACs as a standing committee on nuclear 
security. 
- Promote greater lab to lab cooperation 
- Advocate MPC&A “best practices” globally 
- Help define the technical and legal requirements to pursue nuclear energy without 
sanctions and guarantee access to fuel supplies and waste repositories 
 
Summary 
- Prerequisites for partnership: reducing misunderstanding.   
- A hope for 2015: 
“While the two sides do not completely share a common nuclear threat perception, 
extensive discussions have brought their views closer to one another on both the 
threats from states such as Iran and North Korea and the existence of other potential 
proliferator states.”  
 
Presentation – Russian speaker: 
Thank you for setting the tone on the Vienna meeting.  Your presentation hit all of the major 
points, so I will focus on some key points from my perspective.  We do not have the same 
emphasis on every point/issue: 
- More challenging issue ahead of us is how to ensure that other states do not have a 
willingness to acquire nuclear weapons.  It was stated that under present conditions, when 
nuclear energy is under more and more demand, and the sector is expanding on a large 
scale, a few states fall into an area where they have latent nuclear weapon capability and 
can acquire [weapons] if they so choose.  It is a function of political considerations on 
whether they will pursue/acquire nuclear weapons. We need to consider this and include 
this factor in our foreign policies so other states do not develop the motivation (especially 
political motivation) to acquire nuclear weapons.  This was the clearest point made in 
Vienna from the Russian side [perspective]. 
- The Russian side also thought NPT Article 6 issues and compliance need discussion.  Not 
abolition but rather a closer look at the doctrines and strategies (both U.S. and Russian) 
that put high value on the possession of nuclear weapons and how this signals to other 
states that nuclear weapons are a pillar of national security/policy. 
- Regarding Article 6 commitments, Russian participants noted several paradoxical issues: 
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o Until a state is on the path to acquire nuclear weapons, it is in compliance with its 
NPT obligations.  Once a state is placed on the path to acquisition, however, it is a 
pariah state.  As soon as it acquires a nuclear weapon, it has nuclear standing and 
is no longer a pariah or subjected to true pressures.  This is one paradox. 
o Another paradox: if we say nuclear weapons are a symbol of sovereignty and also 
say we need nuclear weapons so we can maintain the confidence and expertise of 
our labs, how can we tell others not to develop/expand/maintain their nuclear 
capabilities? 
  
It is clear that while we [Russia and the United States] have different priorities, they are not 
insurmountable:  
- First by reducing the motivation for states to acquire nuclear weapons.  TBM defense 
deployed in a regional context can provide a collaborative environment.  Would not be 
deployed against a specific state/entity, but rather serve as a response measure if a threat 
arises.  This requires the involvement of states in the region and serves their security 
needs.  We also need to go by political benchmarks of when a threat arises [this point was 
not very clear but implies consultation on what defines an emerging threat]. 
- An Article 6 discussion is necessary on issues related to nuclear doctrines and 
adjustments that may be required to these doctrines in light of the NPT.  We view 
differently the roles of nuclear weapons in our doctrines and how these roles may impact 
or undermine our NPT obligations. 
- The USSR was a proponent of NFU as a declaratory statement, but only China has it 
today, and this is not a pure declaration on the part of China [he is referring to the “use it 
or lose it” notion that Chinese strategic forces may not survive a first strike and may have 
to be employed at the outset of a nuclear crisis].  Only two countries (the U.S. and 
Russia) have in their doctrines that they could use first.  But the Russian Federation put it 
in because of its weak economic status in the 1990s and Russia knows the U.S. will not 
use nuclear weapons against Russia.   
 
Panel 1: Q&A 
Q: U.S. participant: I have a clarifying question concerning the Vienna meeting.  Regarding the 
US-Russian partnership, it is not just prevention, but what about response to nuclear terrorism?  
There are UNSCRs with positive security assurances to come to the aid of victims of nuclear 
aggression.  So what about the day after?  Was this discussed? 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker: Not a lot of discussion took place in the Vienna meeting on consequence 
management or other post-event issues.  Only attribution and forensics really discussed in this 
area of “post-event cooperation.” 
 
Q: Russian participant: The topic of this panel is mutual perceptions.  The nuclear postures of the 
U.S. and Russian Federation still give the impression of ready to fight a nuclear war against each 
other.  We’ll talk about this more in other panels.  But I was just reading the statement by 
General Baluevsky regarding the latest U.S. proposal [on BMD in Europe] which he strongly 
rejected.  When one looks at force structure and other things that we’re doing, they seem to 
demonstrate that we think the U.S. is still going to attack us.  We would not need some of these 
forces and weapons otherwise.  The U.S. participants know that if they sent a dozen SSBNs on 
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patrol, it would send off red lights in Moscow.  We can’t send a dozen on patrol, but can do other 
things to get you worried.   
 
Answer – U.S. speaker: Regarding declaratory policy or the absence of such policy regarding 
NFU, the absence of a declaration of no first use should not be interpreted that the U.S. plans to 
use first.  Nuclear weapons have always been weapons of last resort and I consider this more 
thoughtful than NFU.  If the overall goal of nuclear weapons is war prevention rather than 
warfighting, then nuclear weapons serve a purpose beyond “use” and also all forms of major 
aggression, to include WMD use, could be prevented.  So “last resort” is more comprehensive 
since we are trying to prevent all kinds of war.  The similarities between the U.S. and Russian 
doctrines are more dramatic than are the differences.  Both sides have made dramatic reductions 
in the numbers and sizes of their arsenals and where we’re heading in 2012 from recent numbers 
of 6,000 now towards 2,200.  Neither country has taken much credit for these dramatic 
reductions.   
 
Concern for me is that the focus has been on strategic vice tactic nuclear weapons, but a nuclear 
weapon is a nuclear weapon and we need to address both types of devices holistically and reduce 
both.  Also we have a relaxed posture now, and we were never on “hair-trigger.”  It’s a myth and 
critics raise this concept [of hair-trigger] too often.  If we’re truly on hair-trigger, why in the last 
60 years have they [nuclear devices] never gone off?  I think we’ve come forward and changed 
dramatically in force posture and state of readiness (both visible and non-visible).   
 
 
Mr. David Stein (left), Mr. Adam Scheinmann (center), and Mr. David Huizenga (right) listen during a 
Question & Answer session. 
 
Looking at the United States: bombers are off alert; there is a reduced bomber role in our war 
plans; a reduced ICBM force; and submarines have a reduced posture (fewer numbers are at sea, 
a relaxed range from targets and not in constant communications).  Submarines are at sea 
because of survivability - not for rapid response of strategic forces or a high state of readiness.  
This is not about an ability to strike first but rather the ability to always strike second.  Pushing to 
reduce alert status, such as de-alerting initiatives, is often destabilizing because this can give the 
incentive to preempt.  Real concern should be the survivability of those forces.  So stability - not 
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de-alerting - should be the metric.  We are posturing forces so they are stable and not to gain any 
incentive to attack first3.  Finally, this is not just declaratory and it is difficult to verify, but today 
we no longer target anyone.  Our weapons have training packages on them and are targeted on 
oceans.  So even if they could inadvertently go off, they target only ocean areas. 
 
Q: Russian participant: I have three questions or comments. Mr. James Woolsey and Mr. 
Scowcroft participated in a meeting in which I was also a participant with then-President Yeltsin.  
Mr. Yeltsin proposed reducing our arsenal size to 1,500 because of our growing economic 
problems.  James Woolsey said the State Department and the administration would not object to 
this size reduction but the military would object because it is always looking at China because of 
the concern of parity and China maybe going to 2,000 [weapons].   
 
Another comment: I think we underestimate real timetables and threats emerging from Iran.  If 
Iran has 3,000 centrifuges, time to make [the special nuclear material], and necessary amounts of 
materials, etc., I think this is somewhat optimistic [rough translation, but believe he is arguing 
that Iran does have the technical capability and has had sufficient time to produce quantities 
sufficient for a crude device].  If I were working for Iran, I wouldn’t wait on special nuclear 
material and would make a simple gun-type device and you [the U.S.] have proven you can make 
this type of charge [he is referencing U.S. weapon designs and testing in the early 1950s].  Seems 
to me that they may have done this already.  And Israeli intelligence seems to indicate that they 
are mounting a warhead on the No-dong [Shahab-3].  Are we confident that the black market has 
not allowed them to get 20-30-40 kilos of weapons grade uranium?  All of this pushes us to more 
actively work together if Iran is a present threat.4    
 
One last question: The center piece for addressing both vertical and horizontal proliferation is the 
CTBT and related protocols.  Even in the Russian Federation which is far more closed than the 
U.S., Russia ratified in 1998 the additional protocols but nothing came from the US.  It seems the 
U.S. does not want to be bound by a treaty or agreement – but you would not be “bound” since 
you can always leave these arrangements.  The NPT has obligations that need to be considered. 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker: There are technical and operational issues why the CTBT was not 
ratified, but we are following in the spirit of the CTBT with our moratorium.  But if we have 
problem with stockpile [and need to test], it is easier to break a moratorium than an international 
treaty.  The reason for the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) is to have a design with a far 
higher confidence that we do not have to test than having existing weapons which are very 
sophisticated and were expected to be tested during their lifespan [in order to ensure component 
reliability].  We would only test in the very remote possibility that we thought there was an issue 
                                                
3 This is the same argument made by Maj.Gen. Dvorkin in his counter-point paper to Dr. Mark Schneider on the 
purpose of current Russian strategic modernization.  In essence, U.S. and Russian experts participating in this 
workshop are making the same argument about survivability providing stability through assured second strike and 
that their modernization programs are about having survivable platforms, not about preemption. 
4 This workshop took place one-week before the release of the unclassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
titled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities which included the key judgments: “We judge with high confidence 
that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that 
Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.”  
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with the deterrent [i.e. loss of confidence in warhead reliability would undermine confidence in 
the nuclear deterrent]. 
 
Q: U.S. participants: What about proliferation shocks that are possible?  Here are a few 
examples: 
- Iran pulls out of the NPT 
- Iran tests a nuclear device 
- Major unexplained outbreak of anthrax in a state next to Iran (a biological attack) 
- Israeli nuclear test; major deterrent posture with Iran and need to openly demonstrate 
- Terrorist use of a nuclear device 
- Failed terrorist use of a nuclear device 
- State use of a nuclear device 
 
Transforming the way we do business — every major nonproliferation advance has historically 
followed a proliferation shock.  So we need to think about shocks that may occur and how do we 
manage them accordingly 
 
Q: Russian participant: I would like to go back briefly to the hair-trigger question.  You said 
there is a high reliability or confidence on non-penetration into command and control systems.  
Hair-trigger does not mean protection is weak, but that the system has the capability to launch in 
2-3 minutes. 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker: My definition is more than just about time but includes the whole system 
of safeguards and procedures.  “Hair-trigger” implies that it can go off outside of your control.  
From technical standpoint, yes, we can launch ICBMs in a short period of time but these systems 
are aimed at oceans [referring to training packages maintained in the systems that would send 
missiles into ocean areas in the highly unlikely case that an unauthorized launch did occur].  
Procedures prevent unauthorized launches.  Just because we have the ability to launch in a short 
period of time does not mean that we will launch.  We have given considerable consideration to 
riding out an attack and a second strike.  Only in extreme circumstances would we launch under 
attack.  From my standpoint, even if we’re attacked by a rogue state, I am not sure we would 
respond with nuclear force but maybe through overwhelming conventional force. Hair-trigger is 
a myth perpetuated by people with their own agendas.  I think both countries have safe arsenals 
[safe controls].   
 
Comment – Russian participant: This issue is very important because there are perceptions and 
misperceptions on command and control but maybe we can revisit this topic in the afternoon. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: During the Cold War we talked a lot [during the course of arms 
control dialogue].  Not sure how we perceive “unacceptable” damage now.  Katrina or 9/11 are 
unacceptable by today’s standards.  During the Cold War it was different; we looked at the 
destruction of nations instead of the loss of individual cities.  So what is necessary to deter 
today’s Russia vice a Cold War totalitarian USSR?  Cannot maintain old assumptions about what 
deters as this drives you to old numbers.  Twenty-first century concerns are different. 
 
U.S.-Russian Dialogue  28-29 November 2007 9
Comment – Russian participant: After the Cold War, Russia and the U.S. are in a strange 
position.  Paradox of needing to maintain mutual deterrence in the absence of a political situation 
or a requirement to deter each other.  I agree that deterrence requires high levels of readiness for 
forces, but an ABM capability in Europe can also deter other countries [referring to the benefit of 
a joint missile defense capability in Europe as a potentially more potent deterrent to a country 
like Iran because of the technical capability and political symbolism provided by such a joint 
effort].   
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  In response to the earlier question, there is a perception that nuclear 
danger is proportional to the number of nuclear weapons.  This is a fallacy; it’s about stability, 
not arsenal numbers.  We can draw down numbers very low and be very unstable.  The stockpile 
we have today is a legacy from the Cold War — high numbers, with high-yields, and moderate 
accuracy; minimal penetration [of ground, not defensive systems] and minimal stand-off 
capabilities.  How can we give this nuclear arsenal capabilities that have conventional attributes? 
[i.e. yield, accuracy, ground-penetration, etc].  These new “conventional attributes” are not about 
use but about credibility.  Deterrence is what is in the mind of an adversary and not what’s in our 
mind.  Historically it is difficult to project adversary thinking.  The habit is therefore for 
everyone to plan for the high-side [of warhead requirements] since we do not know the low-side 
of adversary deterrent levels [i.e. minimal numbers needed to deter an adversary based on the 
adversary’s perspective]. 
   
There is also a moral aspect to your question: the U.S. and Russia have doctrines and [targeting] 
philosophies based on counter-force approaches and not holding populations at risk.  But at some 
point if one goes lower and lower with the number of weapons, you have to hold populations at 
risk because there are not sufficient weapons available to hold forces at risk.  This is a moral 
dilemma since this is not something we’ve ever wanted to do [hold populations at risk as the 
foundation of deterrence]. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: We should be careful not to give the impression that if we executed 
our war plans, we are just destroying forces and not also causing unacceptable deaths in civilians 
[i.e. collateral effects].  Deterrence is also the realization that there is tremendous collateral 
damage even when counter-force targeting is done/planned. 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  I won’t argue or dispute that there is collateral damage from nuclear 
weapons, but a significant difference in philosophy is involved with tailored strike packages 
especially against nuclear [forces] facilities in remote locations. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: But those options [for tailored strike packages] are still available 
when you have low nuclear numbers. 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  Not unless you have significant numbers in reserve [e.g. one cannot rely 
on a deterrent based on a small strike capability unless it is backed by a robust second strike 
capability].  A lot of options for the president that can provide very low collateral of remote 
targets.  So there is a different philosophy here. 
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Dr. Rogov (left) and Adm. Mies (right) take notes. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: I have a brief comment. My approach corresponds to your 
approach.  In Russian war doctrine, the Russian Federation is able [allowed] to use nuclear force 
first and this is the right thing.  But only under conditions where conventional weapons are used 
[by an adversary] and a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation is created by this use of 
conventional weapons5.  By stating the impossibility of holding Russian existence at risk with a 
conventional capability, I must say that I was in the Russian Security Council department that 
analyzed this problem and who insisted on the working section of the strategy that now allows 
this first use [of nuclear weapons]6.  My colleague said China will not use [nuclear weapons] 
first, and I think this is not so.  I think China is like the USSR.  Technically they [the PRC] are 
not able to participate in launch on warning (LOW); China is only able to conduct a first strike 
because they do not have survivable forces.  Therefore statements of the PRC not to use [nuclear 
weapons] first are not operationally realistic.  I agree with the U.S. speakers that Russian and 
American forces have the capability to block the launch of nuclear forces [e.g. PALs and other 
negative control systems].  The difference is that we have a zero flight plan loaded into our 
computers on our missiles and the system is not able to receive orders when a zero flight plan is 
loaded.  One would have to enter a flight plan before the computer can receive orders.  For 
violators [people trying to execute an unauthorized launch], it is almost impossible to do this — 
to load a flight plan and then send launch orders.   
 
Comment – Russian participant:  The answer to the earlier U.S. question is that it is not possible 
[to fully understand what deters people in the 21st century].  There are too many cultural 
questions. The answer is to have a better understanding of cultural issues – for  Mao Tse-tung,  
it’s okay to have half a nation disappear if it eliminates capitalism.   
                                                
5 The Russian speaker is arguing that it is possible for a country to threaten the existence of the Russian Federation 
through the use of superior conventional forces and if this situation appears, Russia must have the option of 
employing nuclear forces first in order to counter this superior conventional capability.  His later comments 
highlight the rise in Chinese conventional capability, but the comments also imply a Russian nuclear first use against 
a superior U.S. conventional capability. 
6 This analysis most likely occurred within a few years of the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in which the effective 
use of high-precision conventional weaponry is known to have made a significant impact on Russian military 
thinking about U.S. conventional capabilities.  
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Also, I believe that if we go down in numbers for our stockpile, the resiliency of our stockpile 
will go up [this point was not further clarified, though he seemed to disagree with the idea that 
numbers which are too low may lead to instability]. 
 
Comment – U.S. speaker: The point of Katrina is a good one.  We had a lot of indicators that it 
could happen and will happen.  To me, that is something that we cannot let happen in a nuclear 
environment; we therefore cannot get complacent on numbers and on what deters. 
 
Panel 2: Threat Reduction in New Environments – Possibilities, Constraints, 
Ways Ahead  
Presentation – Russian speaker:  I am happy to report that this is a much more friendly topic than 
our first theme.  On 28 August 2007, PIR and CEIP/Moscow held the 15th anniversary 
conference for the Nunn-Lugar program.  Among the main themes of the conference/discussion 
were: 
-Prospects for U.S. and Russian cooperation, and 
-Development of collaboration between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. 
  
Three main points to consider on the history of U.S. and Russian cooperation: 
1. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to give up nuclear weapons and join the NPT.  
This prevented the appearance of three new nuclear actors.  
2. Over the span of Nunn-Lugar implementation, no case of leaked nuclear experience and 
nuclear technology has occurred.  This is especially due to MPC&A and over 2,000 
projects/efforts. 
3. Elimination of surplus stockpile and delivery vehicles [Gives current numbers from the 
CTR “scorecard” of disposal efforts to date]. 
There are other achievements to speak of: counter-proliferation initiative involving over 72,000 
former weapon scientists and the prevention of brain-drain 
 
Obstacles to U.S.-Russian cooperation: 
1. For some projects, there is mutual dissatisfaction with the system for providing funding.  
Too much bureaucracy and delays between agencies have slowed down projects over the 
last few years. 
2. Domestic and international political factors have slowed down some projects as well. 
 
The CTR program is in its final phases.  Even if it ends in 2013, does not mean we cannot extend 
the concepts of the program.  Eight countries spent [“pledged” is more accurate] $20Bn to assist 
Russia in nonproliferation efforts, and unlike last century, Russia is no longer just a recipient 
now.  Russia contributes $2Bn to program; second largest after the United States.  The Russian 
Federation continues to increase its financial contributions, but not all partners of the global 
partnership allocate their promised amounts.  Implementation of CTR has to deal with most 
sensitive means [aspects] of national security [his point being that the U.S. and Russia have a 
track record of cooperating in extremely sensitive areas].  Nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles, 
biological weapons, etc.  Now there are twenty countries in the global partnership; not just the 
exclusive G-8.  There is an increasing number of countries that can achieve mass destruction 
capabilities and more international money is needed to liquidate these capabilities.  North Korea 
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as one example and chemical weapons destruction in Albania financed by the U.S. as another 
example.  Global partnership means not just Russia and Ukraine but around the world efforts to 
limit technologies as well as the risks posed by non-weaponized materials [non-weapons grade 
radioactive materials].  
 
U.S. Presentation on the Evolution of CTR: 
It’s amazing to think of the vision required in 1991 to launch this effort right as the Cold War 
was ending.  Very hard to make it work but success was made due to individuals on both sides 
fighting to make achievements. 
 
The CTR mission is shifting from legacy programs of elimination, dismantlement of WMD, and 
the implementation of major arms control treaties such as START.  Since 2001, CTR has been 
viewed as a tool in the global war against terror.  It have expanded beyond Eurasia (especially 
Russia), and Albania is an example of this expansion.  There is also strong support in Congress 
for CTR with Senators Levin, McCain, and Domenici recently increasing by $80M the 
President’s request [for CTR].  This is a good indication that no matter who is the next president, 
this effort will continue because of Congressional support. 
  
Here is the “scorecard” for CTR to date.  You’ll note that there is a tendency to fund visible/ 
tangible efforts (i.e. what can be counted and seen).  These are impressive accomplishment, but 
this graphic does not capture an important part of this effort – the process.  There are enduring 
relationships between professionals on both sides and this personal dynamic cannot be captured 
in a chart.  It’s more important than the actual numbers for weapons and systems dismantled.   
 
CTR  Scorecard: Strategic Offens ive Arms  E limination
Ukraine, Kazakhs tan, & Belarus  are Nuclear Weapons  Free
C TR
B as eline











































ICBM S ilos E liminated
ICBM Mobile Launchers Des troyed
Bombers E liminated
Nuclear ASMs Des troyed
S LBM Launchers  E liminated
S LBMs E liminated
S SBNs Des troyed
Nuclear Test Tunnels /Holes  Sealed
ICBMs Des troyed
C urrent numbers as of November 13, 2007;  projections as  of Dec 31, 2006
 
 
U.S.-Russian Dialogue  28-29 November 2007 13
CTR  S corecard:  WMD E limination, Safety, & S ecurity
Ukraine, Kazakhs tan, & Belarus  are Nuclear Weapons  Free
C urrent C umulative
















Nuclear Weapons  Storage Site S ecurity Upgrades* 
TADR  E pidemiological Monitoring S tations 
Built & E quipped
CWDF Des ign (Percent Completed) 
CWDF Cons truction (Percent Completed) 
Nuclear Weapons Transport Train Shipments 
C urrent numbers as  of November 13, 2007; projections as of Dec 31, 2006
* T o be completed in 2008
 
 
Regarding the earlier question on cooperation in consequence management and response, there is 
a new direction for the Nunn-Lugar program that involves disease outbreak monitoring.  Efforts 
include the building of monitoring stations for identifying and tracking outbreaks.  This does not 
mean, however, a complete end to what we’ve been doing.  Legacy programs will continue - 
they are fairly cut and dry and easy to implement.  Moreover, cooperation on the ground is very 
good. 
 
The Bratislava Initiative is another example of a new threat reduction approach where the focus 
is on improving the security of warheads stored in Russia.  This will continue through 2008 but 
also some sustainment may be needed.7  An additional example of new CTR efforts is the 
chemical weapon elimination facility in Shchuch’ye, Russia where the United States has spent 
over $1Bn. 
 
The following graphic shows where we are today and what we’re thinking for the future.  CTR 
efforts have increased outside of Russia, especially in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Georgia, and Azerbaijan.  This graph shows that the overall funding for CTR outside of Russia 
(“non-Russia” locations) is continuing to increase while the funding for CTR efforts within 
Russia continues to decrease.  Examples of “non-Russia” efforts include the establishment of a 
chemical weapon disposal site near Tirana, Albania to eliminate 16 metric tons of agent; 
numerous defense and military contacts program that involve exercises, exchanges, etc. between 
national security agencies; and WMD proliferation prevention efforts that focus on border 
security and border enforcement. 
                                                
7 A February 2007 GAO report cautioned that many U.S.-funded security upgrades provided only limited 
enhancements and that the Russian government has encountered difficulty in maintaining even these limited 
upgrades at certain nuclear sites.7 
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A significant area where CTR emphasis has grown is in the area of reducing biological threats.  
The Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) is an important and growing area.  In the 
nuclear area, we [the U.S. and Russia] have lots of experience and have held lots of discussions.  
But in the biological area, we are playing catch-up.  The program started in 1997 in response to 
an NAS study with an initial budget of $2M year; its budget is now $200M year.  Up to 50% of 
the overall DoD Nunn-Lugar funding now goes into bio programs.  This includes joint research 
efforts between scientists such as the Vektor lab on developing drugs to treat smallpox.   
 
The Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) falls under the BTRP program and 
recognizes that biological threats can be caused by mother nature as well as man.  Key to 
containing these events is the quick detection and identification of an outbreak.  The graphic 
below shows the scope of the TADR network and the countries currently engaged.  The Tbilisi, 
Georgia facility being built for $80M [expected completion in 2009] will serve as the central 
reference facility for TADR and the central hub in south caucus for monitoring disease outbreaks 
and diagnostics.  In 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin met in Crawford, Texas and issued a joint 
statement saying that cooperation in biological threat reduction was a bilateral goal, but limited 
progress was made in this area until recently and there is still much to do.  It’s worth noting, 
however, the President Putin did send anthrax experts to the United States in the fall of 2001 to 
help with the investigation of the anthrax attacks. 
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A recent NAS report (Sept. 2007) provides a detailed assessment on the BTRP: 
- increased emphasis on public health and agriculture  
- includes a definition for biological weapon, which is very helpful.  “Pathogen that can be 
used to cause grave harm to people and agriculture” – this helps to emphasize that this is 
not a hardware issue, something that is sometimes hard to understand in a military 
context. 
- need to reenergize Bio cooperation with the Russian Federation.   
- BTRP should give greater emphasis to a comprehensive, multifaceted approach to 
international engagement for achieving biosecurity, public health, and agriculture 
objectives.  
- DoD should work through existing scientific networks and establish new models as 
appropriate to reinvigorate BTRP in Russia by supporting cost-shared collaborative 
research projects, scientific conferences, and other scientific activities that promote both 
Russian and U.S. national security interests through engagement of outstanding 
established and young scientists in the two countries. 
DoD will respond to Congress with its assessment of this recent NAS report. 
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The future of CTR: 
- BTRP has created a useful model for pathogen security and early warning of bioterror 
attacks and potential pandemics.  We are able to apply this model to other countries 
within/outside the FSU, to include Armenia, Afghanistan and potentially Pakistan in 
2008. 
- Potential engagement of Russian Ministry of Agriculture, depending on the conclusion of 
the necessary legal framework. 
- A much more likely scenario than nuclear terrorism is terrorist acquisition and use of a 
biological capability.  If our two countries can work on the security of operational nuclear 
warheads, then why not cooperate on bio? 
- Bio is a very real global threat 
 
Q&A 
Comment – U.S. participant: I would add to both of your concluding comments: 
- There is a great importance in the need to create a security culture in countries around the 
world, and this includes security for such things as nuclear power plants.  This is an 
important lesson that Russia has learned from us because their tradition of relying on 
strong physical security has made them think that other security measures are not needed.  
Kola is a high-point of this collaborative work. 
- In the area of redirection of the software component of WMD systems [“software” 
referring to the human element], with North Korea, a great deal of attention is being paid 
to the dismantlement of their facilities.  But a great deal of expertise went into building 
these capabilities and facilities.  There have been some initial discussions with Russia on 
how to address the North Korean experts. 
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Comment – Russian participant: I have three points to make: 
1. Bioterror is a much greater threat than nuclear terror.  This threat will only grow in the 
foreseeable future.  It does not require a sophisticated industrial base.  Apparently not 
enough is being done yet to cooperate here.  We need to raise the priority of bioterror. 
2. There is a bazaar for nuclear weapons and nuclear technology, but it is not in Russia.  
Here the U.S. is guilty because it has used kids’ gloves on Pakistan.  The main source of 
proliferation of technology has been Pakistan.  I don’t know anyone who does not think 
ISI was not aware of the A.Q. Khan net.  We really do not know if it has stopped.  This is 
really dangerous since Pakistan is the only nuclear state where control of nuclear 
weapons could go into very bad hands.  Here I am not so sure that the American military 
and intelligence are not thinking about what measures to take if a disastrous situation 
occurs in Pakistan.  Am sure that the same thoughts exist in Russia.  We may not act 
together [the U.S. and Russia] but we can discuss what to do in such a situation.  Some 
type of comparative thinking is badly needed.  Not sure about the format [for holding 
these discussions] and the government should be kept away [his point being that some 
informal dialogue may initially be more productive that formal gov-to-gov discussions]. 
3. The Nunn-Lugar program: historical significance is enormous.  It was absolutely unique 
and signaled a clean break from Cold War mentality.  Totally different type of 
relationship that should ideally be continued [i.e. joint cooperation on issues/threats that 
are of mutual interest].   
 
Comment – U.S. participant 
The CTR program has evolved and we tend to think of the tools that make CTR work.  The 
“New future” is related to the traditional non-proliferation regime.  If going to have a safe and 
secure expansion of [civilian] nuclear power, we need to have controls and protocols in place to 
secure the goodies associated with nuclear power.  There is also an unfinished agenda related to 
old regime(s).  The point concerning the next nonproliferation shock is important; we jump from 
initiative to initiative and do not spend enough time on monitoring and enforcement of the 
existing/established regimes.  The nuclear supplier guidelines from 1978 have unclear 
guidance/rules on supplying; these guidelines need to be updated.   
 
Concerning Article 6 and threat reduction, we tend to speak to Article 6 through numbers 
[meaning the focus tends to be on arsenal size and the reduction of numbers], but broader interest 
is in some Article 6 end-state that maybe cannot be named today [in other words, we should be 
assessing more deliberately potential end-states and the interim steps involved in achieving these 
end-states]. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: The Russian proposal in Vienna was to have an S&T based, non-
discriminatory list of criteria for countries that want [civilian] nuclear power.  A country has to 
meet criteria before coming to the IAEA for assistance with the development of their nuclear 
power program.  The development of this criteria list could be a cooperative effort between the 
U.S. and Russia. 
 
Question – Russian participant: I would like to add on some detail to what was discussed 
concerning CTR.  There are difficulties and drawbacks related to these projects in Russia.  When 
you see how CTR is organized in Ukraine, all questions on implementing the program are 
U.S.-Russian Dialogue  28-29 November 2007 18
focused on one individual – the deputy minister of the health ministry.  He has stated that in his 
hand, he has everything: finances, access, subcontractors for these works, etc.  In Russia there is 
not one responsible party/individual for coordinating the CTR program.  Tens of ministries are 
responsible for these programs.  Marshall Sergeyev did try to implement one single focal point, 
but all of the ministries have a financial stake in maintaining their piece of the process.  Can’t the 
U.S. push the Russian Federation to have one person/organization for these efforts in order to cut 
through bureaucracy?  
 
Comment – Russian participant:  I do not think this is realistic what was just said [about having 
the U.S. push for a single focal point in Russia].  
 
Question – U.S. participant: Commentators and critics will ask why should the United States 
continue to provide money to the Russian Federation for CTR programs when Russia is making 
so much money on oil.  A usual response is that we can end these programs and save some 
money, but we do not have confidence that Russia will continue these programs in the absence of 
U.S. funding.  Even if Russia does continue the funding, the international standards may be 
lowered without U.S. oversight or influence.  According to these commentators, we must stay 
engaged so we ensure international standards are maintained.  
 
Comment – Russian participant: Frankly speaking, we must admit how bad relations are.  Gen. 
Baluevsky stated today [reading from the newspaper] that “we are not going to provide free 
assistance to the United States for BMD that can/will be used against the Russian Federation.”  
Last Wednesday when my colleagues went to get visas at the U.S. consulate, they were told to 
come back in three weeks even though their flights were in a few days.  I made some calls and 
we were able to work around this bureaucratic obstacle.  The key people making decisions 
concerning lab-to-lab cooperation are counter-intelligence experts from both countries.  These 
are extremely dangerous trends.  No one has been fired for refusing to give a visa but one can get 
in trouble for giving one too easily.  The classic Cold War model is reemerging – don’t cooperate 
easily; don’t give them anything…. 
 
 
MajGen Zolotarev (left), ColGen Yesin (center), and Mr. Andy Weber (right) listen and take notes. 
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Working Lunch Discussion 
Comments - U.S. participant:  The Vienna workshop papers that were distributed the week 
before this meeting seem to show puzzlement on why the U.S. has not signed the CTBT.  It feels 
like we’re going back to the terrible days of the late 1990’s.  There are many reasons for the 
failure to get the CTBT ratified. Politically, there was anger at the Clinton administration.  In 
addition, there were conservative Republican senators who were angry about failing to block the 
chemical weapons convention and who said the next one will not go through.  The first issue is 
gone, but the second issue will continue after 2008 because Republicans do not like arms control.  
It’s hard to get two-thirds of the Senate to vote for an arms control treaty.  An example is the 
Law of the Sea Convention which President Bush is in favor of but for which there is not much 
support and all Republican candidates are also against.   
 
Another argument concerning the CTBT was that we could not maintain the safety and security 
of the U.S. nuclear stockpile if we ratified the CTBT as this would limit our options.  Come 
2009, we will have more than a decade of experience in stockpile stewardship while under the 
testing moratorium.  However, history has also shown that you cannot ratify a treaty if the 
president does not support it since treaty ratification can require tremendous political capital and 
investment. 
 
Some experts also argue that we could not tell if Russia and China were cheating through the 
conduct of extremely low-yield tests and/or decoupling.  There is a mixed report on this.  The 
international monitoring system is more effective – in technical terms – than originally expected.  
Experience includes the North Korean nuclear test and atmospheric sampling that was able to 
provide - in public forum - proof that radiation detected in Yellowknife, Canadian NW territories 
verified a North Korean test.  A problem that will remain is that opponents of the CTBT will say 
most sophisticated nuclear weapon states will test with very tiny yields and can get away with it.  
People who support ratification have trouble answering this concern about whether a low-yield 
test actually provides any useful information to an advanced nuclear weapon state from a design 
and employment perspective.  We will most likely need confidence-building measures between 
China, Russian and the United States before the CTBT is approved. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: A strategy that focuses on the detection of low-yield events will 
fail.  It is literally impossible to detect all levels.  Maybe the Paul Nitze concept of effective 
verification is appropriate.  Not that we can detect all cheating but rather we can detect cheating 
that might matter militarily – that which provides a militarily significant change to sophisticated 
programs.  There is some evidence of this in the U.S. and there are people who believe that 
testing at very low yields will not matter.  More advance nuclear programs know how stuff 
works so there is limited benefit [from a military perspective] of conducting low-yield tests. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: This point raises an interesting issue about what we mean by 
“militarily effective.”  The JCS went on record under Admiral Bill Crow during the INF 
negotiations on the general criteria for militarily effective cheating. 
 
Comment – Russian participant:  Concerning the question on why we still need CTR, we lack 
funding for many government programs in Russia.  Poverty is still very high in Russia and 
programs to address this significant problem require money.  Programs to execute CTR are also 
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expensive.  So what would be an appropriate priority for spending Russian funds [and would 
other defense requirements take priority over CTR]? 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: CTR is robust and growing in DTRA because a series of managers 
and leaders have prioritized and grown this program.  It’s also an area where military 
commanders want to be engaged today as it falls into the significant area of “Phase Zero” 
activities.  There is a very strong interest in these areas. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: There is obviously a significant economic dimension to this 
discussion. Russia was almost a failed state when CTR started.  The Russian defense budget was 
approximately $10Bn and the U.S. offered $500M – ten times more than Russia could afford.   
Now the Russian defense budget is $40Bn or a purchasing power parity of $80Bn compared to 
the United States.  Yet Russia spends more money on CTR than the U.S. now gives [to Russia, 
but CTR funds are shifting and increasing to non-Russian projects].  More significant is the 
political significance of the problem; we can find the money to execute CTR in Russia if this is 
necessary.  But these programs will not have the same impetus without U.S. involvement.  CTR 
is a proven way that the U.S. and Russia can work in this utmost secretive area and this 
degree/type of cooperation is significant. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: There was a study done for DTRA on the history of the CTR 
program.  It found that CTR needed men of courage to step forward in both the United States and 
in Russia.  Maybe an option is to create an observer status for people from India or Pakistan to 
let them see how the U.S. and Russia jointly handle these issues - maybe health ministers. [A 
potential comparison could be the allowance of third-party observer status for some U.S.-Russian 
Open Skies missions]. 
 
Panel 3: Evolving Russian and American Strategic Postures 
Presentation – Russian speaker: Begins his presentation by providing an overview of the 
numbers associated with Russian strategic systems and warheads as well as the ongoing Russian 
R&D and acquisition activities.   
 
Russian speaker: For the foreseeable future, Russia will maintain a nuclear triad and I will not 
repeat what I said yesterday [this joke is a reference to comments made during the Nuclear 
Strategy Forum on 27 Nov 078 when he stated that it was not realistic for Russia to say it will 
have twelve SSBNs as four to five was much more likely; moreover, experience from the Soviet 
era shows that ~20% of the nuclear capable submarines would be on active patrols but one would 
expect a much lower ratio/percentage today]. 
 
The speaker continues by citing previous statements made by U.S. officials and how these 
statements were primarily rhetoric since U.S. officials (especially military commanders) often 
rotate out of their assignments fairly regularly and are therefore not able to implement bold 
                                                
8 The day prior to this workshop, the Nuclear Strategy Forum and the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (ASCO, DTRA) hosted a half-day forum on U.S.-Russian strategic relations.  All 
of the Russian participants in this CISAC, NAS workshop and several of the American participants participated in 
this half-day Nuclear Strategy Forum as well, so there will be occasional references to this previous discussion. 
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changes.  Examples given include: Gen. Butler who said that he would make heavy bombers 
non-nuclear then Adm. Chiles who said he would not touch the Air Force (i.e. would keep the 
heavy bombers nuclear capable).   
 
The official changes in the strategic doctrine of the Russian Federation have included moving 
beyond the negative guarantees provided in previous documents (e.g. will not use against non-
nuclear countries) to the current doctrine that is a mirror image of all doctrines (except Chinese) 
that existed before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  (Russian comment: “We never copy 
anything good from the U.S., only the bad”).  I should note that I have had heated discussions 
with Chinese officials over the years concerning their NFU pledge.  If they cannot retaliate with 
nuclear weapons [i.e. if they do not have a survivable second strike capability] and will have no 
first use, then what does that leave on the table for them? 
 
Speeches with very contradictory statements are not uncommon in both the United States and in 
Russia.  There is a factor of twenty-five difference between the U.S. and Russian budgets yet 
they have the same type of global mission requirements.  On the 29th of November there will be a 
speech by President Putin that may give some specific guidance we are hoping for on strategic 
requirements and objectives.  
 
U.S. presentation: Our Russian colleagues heard one way on describing the U.S. strategic posture 
yesterday [at the Nuclear Strategy Forum meeting].  I want to present a different description, one 
that entails six things: 
1. Policy as we officially describe it (the NPR); 
2. The increasing importance of defenses; 
3. Similar to Russia, a significant reduction in weapons and delivery systems since the end 
of the Cold War; 
4. Continuation of a historic U.S. policy of not being specific on when we would use 
nuclear weapons.  The United States rejects “no first use” and both parties hold open the 
option to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical attack);  
5. A great premium on flexibility in targeting rather than the Cold War approach of massive 
targeting plans; and 
6. For this administration, clearly a strong reduction in the perceived value of arms control 
as an element of strategic posture. 
 
When we came out of the Cold War, we had a very large force designed for a single adversary 
and a large scale exchange.  The NPR stated that, yes, nuclear weapons are still crucial but their 
role has dramatically changed.   
1. For most of my professional life, day-to-day nuclear planning was about the Soviet Union 
and the Russian Federation.  But the NPR clearly states that Russia no longer poses an 
immediate threat to the security of the United States. 
2. For most of my professional life, the people who thought about nuclear weapons were in 
one room and those who thought about other weapons were in another room.  The NPR 
said both types weapons should all be treated as one capability.  This single approach 
does not mean increased emphasis on nuclear weapons. 
3. The NPR emphasized that we have a very poor capability to predict the future.  We can 
reduce forces now must be prepared to respond to change.  This is a philosophic reason 
U.S.-Russian Dialogue  28-29 November 2007 22
why we have not ratified the CTBT.  The Treaty of Moscow allows us to change our 
mind the next day. 
4. Instead of saying we can predict threat, types, numbers, etc, NPR said we need a 
capabilities-based approach to our planning, although this concept is still not clear within 
the U.S. government.   
 
The intent of the NPR was not to give increased emphasis to nuclear weapons and the review did 
not change the historic U.S. view that the President and only the President can delegate nuclear 
release or use authority.   
 
What else has changed?  We now speak of a new Triad – strike forces, defenses (BMD but also 
others), and R&D and industrial capabilities that provide a responsive infrastructure.  Among the 
main functions our forces perform are: 
1. Assure our allies – have to respond to attacks on our allies. 
2. Dissuade potential adversaries – no country in the world except for Russia could reach 
parity [in nuclear capabilities] with the U.S.  Did not specifically say China could 
not/should not reach parity, but could infer this from the NPR.  
3. Deter. 
4. Defend against and defeat – in practice, meant defense. 
 
Force structure was not an important NPR change; but was a continuation of Cold War systems.  
We reduced numbers within the traditional nuclear Triad but did not get rid of any leg.  The 
reduced number was/is the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with out 
security needs.  This equated to about one-third of what was allowed under START, though 
different counting rules do exist.  We retain reserve weapons as a hedge.  For example, we can 
shift/swap warheads on ICBMs if a problem develops with one warhead design 
 
Defenses are focused on North Korea and Iran.  Many Americans believe we do not understand 
how to deter North Korea and Iran effectively, which is why U.S. defense capability is 
important.  I was in this administration from the beginning and served until just recently and 
have not heard anyone talk about defense versus Russia.  You may not believe me, but it’s true. 
 
1. RRW: The narrow meaning of RRW is to replace some of the W-76 on Trident missiles. 
When we designed the W-76 we believed it was important to have a lot of warheads on our 
missiles and so we wanted warheads with a very high yield-to-weight ratio.  We also thought 
plutonium was a very scarce resource - hard to believe now.  These design goals led to very 
narrow performance margins and therefore a warhead design that is susceptible to aging.  Now 
we can use extra space and weight [on the Trident due to low numbers of warheads loaded up] 
and more availability in weight to improve performance margins so that warheads are less 
susceptible to aging.  And since we are redesigning the warheads, we can also add the latest and 
really tremendous safety and security features.  Overall, these are the same military 
characteristics, the same missile, and the same mission, so not a new warhead 
 
2. RRW: The broader application is to apply concepts from the RRW to rest of the stockpile. Get 
rid of beryllium, conventional explosive, etc. so we can go away from old design decisions that 
have impacted the ability to maintain the stockpile. 
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Despite the brilliance of my explanation, not everyone says the RRW is a good idea….  Some 
think the RRW will lead to nuclear testing [to verify the design] and there is also the perception 
that this administration has a preponderance to use force.  Critics are also concerned about the 
effect on nonproliferation.  My guess is that the program will survive but that funding will be 
substantially less than requested. 
 
For this meeting of U.S. and Russian experts, the importance of the NPR is a total change in 
what Americans mean when they say “nuclear threat.”  It used to mean the threat from the Soviet 
Union.  In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. just simply does not pay any attention to a threat 
from Russia.  Not that we don’t respect the capability; we just don’t see a plausible way for war 
to occur between our countries.  Instead, threats come from proliferation and nuclear terrorism.  




Dr. Richard Weitz takes notes during the discussion on Russian Strategic Forces 
 
Comment – Russian participant: According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the W-76-1 is a 
program designed for the life extension of the original W-76.  The concept is to make the W-76 
as close as possible to how it was when it was made 30 years ago.  RRW says let’s be bolder and 
remanufacture the warhead based on how we would have made the W-76 thirty years ago if we 
had the technology and the threats we have today.  The life extension program will continue.  My 
personal view is that the W-76-1 life extension with the W-88 are mixed on submarines so if 
there is a problem with one, not loose submarine capability.  Otherwise would have to test. 
 
Presentation – U.S. speaker: An American perspective on Russia’s nuclear forces. 
There are two main points underlying this presentation: 
- Maintaining nuclear forces is clearly a defense priority for Russia. 
- Russia’s doctrine is intended to counter potential threats from NATO and the U.S. 
 
Will raise several questions and issues during this discussion: 
- Like the U.S., Russia faces a challenging environment with conventional and sub-
conventional threats.  Retiring old systems, testing launch and delivery platforms, 
manufacturing challenges, etc. 
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- It’s not clear that the Topol-M can be manufactured to its required or desired capabilities.  
It is characterized as the most advanced ICBM in world, however production levels are 
consistently low and at the present rate Russia will see a decreasing number of active 
ICBMs.  This is significant because it is the land-based component of the triad that 
Russia historically relies on. 
- The Navy can be expected to play a greater role [in Russia’s deterrent] over the next 
decade.  The Bulava missile has had a moderately successful testing program with some 
successes and some failures.  The overall status of the program is unclear.  Will become 
more effective over time.  This is in conjunction with the 4th generation Borey-class 
submarine that is reliant on the Bulava SLBM as it’s main weapon system [in other 
words, without a successful Bulava program, the new Borey-class SSBNs will be 
toothless].  
- Strategic aviation was and remains the weakest leg of the Soviet/Russian deterrent.  One 
to two refurbished strategic bombers a year are returned to operations.  Effectiveness of 
strategic aviation is unclear.  It is vulnerable to NATO air defenses.  Sufficient fuel and 
maintenance are now available though this was not the previous case.  And no 
replacement is on the drawing boards for Russia’s strategic bombers. 
- Tactical nuclear weapons: Russia has higher numbers than anyone else.  So many of them 
and stored in different locations; this prevents first strike because adversary cannot be 
sure these dispersed weapons will all be hit. 
- The Russian Federation has the only operational NMD [around Moscow].   
 
Reducing overall numbers and the reliance on the new Bulava SLBM shows the potential risk 
that can emerge if a single capability fails or is delayed in being procured.  This also highlights a 
break in the Soviet practice of maintaining experts in government service when money draws 
them into the private sector.  Some additional wildcards include Russia having to increase 
spending on its conventional forces when it enacts such measures as going to a volunteer force 
(pay, benefits, etc).  And in an arms control environment, how will Russia and the United States 
deal with France, the UK, and China?  Do they bring in third parties to discuss the future? 
  
Presentation – Russian speaker: “A Russian outlook at American strategic forces and doctrine.”  
When the Russian Federation looks at and evaluates the strategic forces and doctrine in the 
United States, the premise in the U.S. appears to be that the United States must remain the only 
dominant nuclear power in the world and that no one should ever compete.  The objective is the 
“unpunishable” application of nuclear power backed by defenses.  In Russia, there is much 
concern that going from START to SORTS reductions are based mostly on the dismantlement or 
re-declaration of heavy bombers and rearming these bombers with conventional weapons.  This 
creates a great “return potential” for the United States [an ability to return to previous strategic 
numbers].  While 1,700 to 2,200 is the goal in 2010, there is a 2,500 to 3,500 comeback or return 
potential that the U.S. has.  Allegedly the U.S. believes that parity with Russia is possible 
[referring to earlier comments by a U.S. speaker].  This phrase wasn’t in the NPR I saw since 
one can find classified portions of the NPR available on the internet.  The phrase I saw was that 
no one could be allowed to reach parity.   
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Regarding the RRW, it is a good program.  It’s better to reduce megatons and increase reliability.  
When we redesigned Russian warheads, we took this approach and therefore have a lot of 
robustness in our designs unlike the W-76 issues. 
 
The maritime-based estimates for Russia are wrong.  By 2012, experts say that Russia will have 
800-1,000 land-based warheads, approximately 600 naval and approximately 400 air-leg 
warheads.  The Russian Federation does not believe it needs to go to the highest threshold of 
these numbers or numbers allowed by the Moscow Treaty.  A 2005 decision was made in the 
Russian Security Council and agreed upon by President Putin to not try to reach parity with the 
United States but to achieve a “balance of capabilities.”9 
  
All tactical nuclear weapons are stored at central storage facilities; not in Kalinigrad and not in 
Belarus.  There are no storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in either of these areas. 
 
As for aviation flights, we haven’t done it [patrols] for awhile, so this is more of a 
rhetoric/gesture [referring to the recent resumption of long-range patrols].  It’s normal for pilots 
to train and they need to learn to navigate and fly just like U.S. pilots who fly to Guam. 
 
Concerning the tempo of rearmament, Russian industry may not catch-up to us [he means that 
the defense industrial base is struggling to meet delivery quotas]. 
 
Finally, there is a clear understanding in Russia that hostilities between the United States and the 
Russian Federation are not possible. 
 
Q&A 
Comment – Russian participant: I agree that a reduction of numbers does not equal a decrease in 
the threat of an inadvertent launch.  But I do disagree on the “hair-trigger concept.”  We should 
have Russian and American C3 experts sit down together and they may be able to quietly analyze 
this problem.  Ten years ago a unique meeting was held in California of U.S. and Russia C3 
experts but nothing came of this effort.10  Control and blocking [i.e. negative controls] is the 
right area for bilateral cooperation and discussion and can be done without the risk that we will 
enter into each other’s command and control situation.  “De-alerting” is about reducing the time 
to launch from 2-3 minutes to perhaps one hour or more.  The previously mentioned idea of 
Chinese and American experts establishing a glossary of terms to facilitate bilateral discussions 
is a great idea.  This would be good for US-Russian discussions, too. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: Concerning the idea of a glossary, “hair-trigger” represents a 
system that is able to respond in a quick period of time.  However, “hair-trigger” is also a 
pejorative characterization of land-based forces as it implies the ability to go off quickly in an 
accidental or unauthorized manner.  There are concerns with lowering the response rate of 
ICBMs: this is non-verifiable and must rely on trust.  There is also a technical challenge in doing 
this with the Minuteman III as it was designed to be spun-up for war and not spun-up and down 
                                                
9 This seems to be a capabilities-based argument that overall numbers do not matter; only the operational capabilities 
of the various systems and warheads matter. 
10 Referring to the 4-14 August 1997 meeting in LaJolla, California, of U.S. and Russian command and control 
experts. 
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for training.  So this creates a reliability issue when spinning-down ICBMs today; they 
sometimes don’t come back up.  Overall, we need to get away from this “hair-trigger” 
characterization. 
 
Concerning quotes attributed earlier to Gen. Butler or Adm. Chiles, the Commander of 
USSTRATCOM is only one voice in the U.S. strategic community.  Services and Policy people 
have strong voices in determining the U.S. force structure.   
 
We have a triad that is very reliant on the sea-based leg.  Survivability of forces is much more 
important than response rate.  In addition, it is not U.S. policy to launch under attack (LUA) or 
launch on warning (LOW).  Moreover, we really only have a dyad: our bombers are not on alert 
and would take time to generate.  We seek value in having multiple delivery systems and 
multiple warheads in order to have reliability.  War prevention, not warfighting, is the perceived 
value in our nuclear weapons.  Not use, but the potential for use.  “Weapons of last resort” is a 
fundamental concept.  Agree with the U.S. speaker that a certain degree of ambiguity serves our 
purpose and deters/provides uncertainty for our adversaries.   
 
 
MajGen. Dvorkin (left) asks a questions while Col. Yarynich (right), Mr. Paul Bernstein (back, left) and Dr. 
Kerry Kartchner (back, center) listen. 
 
When you talk about RRW and LE [life extension] programs, it’s a dead-end in the long-term to 
have LE.  Independent of plutonium, about 6,000 parts go into our warheads and the designs are 
very complicated.  RRW is the only path that will get us to where we need to go in the long-term. 
 
If serious about discussions on Article 6, then we need to account for tactical nuclear weapons.  
Regarding reconstitution [of our strategic stockpile and delivery vehicles] and our ability to do so 
- while we do retain this capability, it is a very complicated endeavor and not a simple process.   
Not days or weeks but months or longer. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: President Putin said deployment of BMD to Poland is like the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.  We are discussing the suspension of our involvement in the CFE Treaty 
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but international law does not recognize the concept of “suspension.”  And “survivability” 
sounds like a Cold War concept.  If the United States has SSBNs in two ports, then in theory two 
nuclear weapons can significantly reduce an amount of the U.S. deterrent.  If Russia is not an 
“immediate threat,” is it still a threat?  Even if not believe we’re going to go to war, the SRF acts 
every day as if it is going to go to war with the U.S. 
   
The debate on de-alerting is unfortunate.  The real issue is that the Russian Federation will 
maintain nuclear weapons.  Mutual deterrence is an action-reaction to what the rules of the game 
necessitates11. 
 
Question – U.S. participant:  Regarding hair-trigger and de-alerting, “risk” is rather that political 
leaders will require premature retaliation without really knowing what is happening.   
 
Answer – U.S. participant: I do not know any sane person in that position who would do that 
without knowing what is going on.  Scenarios I’ve played in show that the people who are closer 
than I to the actual system [for release authorization] express the same fear. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: Launch on warning in Russian means something different; it 
relates to threat perception.  We are not talking about the same stuff. 
 
Comment – Russian participant:  A few words in regards to the new U.S. nuclear doctrine.  I 
agree that steps taken to reduce the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals have been significant 
ones.  Assure, dissuade, deny, and deter are all important tasks but they are not part of war-
fighting.  I recall one Chinese tactician (Sun Tzu?) who said the best fighting is one in which you 
can win without fighting.  I strongly suggest that U.S. experts pay closer attention to what is 
being said there [in China].  We do also understand that the U.S. President maintains authority 
[for nuclear use/release].  However, regional commands could be authorized to use when it is not 
a threat to U.S. national survival12.   
 
Panel 4: Moving Beyond US-RF Impasse on BMD 
Presentation – Russian speaker: A few opening comments.  There is some modernization of the 
NMD system around Moscow, but this is mostly in information technology systems/areas, but I 
cannot discuss this further.  We do not need fifteen new types of inspections, etc. through new 
arms control agreements.  How can we step back from MAD?  A roadmap is possible.  Lowering 
the level of combat alert; disconnecting warheads from delivery vehicles or some other 
comparable level of functional change is possible.  Any of these steps results in buying us a few 
hours.  Overall if we do this wisely [lowering the level of combat alert], this can even buy us a 
few months.  Need to wave good-bye to the idea of LOW.  De-targeting is not a viable step; de-
                                                
11 Believe he means that the U.S. and Russia will both maintain a nuclear capability for the foreseeable future and 
this naturally results in a mutual deterrence dynamic between the two countries. 
12 This is a point made repeatedly by Maj.Gen. Zolotarev that the U.S. doctrine theoretically allows the U.S. to use 
nuclear weapons in a regional context away from the United States when U.S. interests are at stake but the actual 
survivability of the United States as a nation is not at risk.  This is where Russia and the United States differ 
according to Zolotarev]. 
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alerting means lowering the level of combat alert and this is verifiable and a viable option.  In 
2004 there was a draft of an Executive Agreement to do away with LOW. 
 
An option for the U.S.-Russian impasse on BMD: Adopt a compromise that gives our 
government and the United States the opportunity to save face regarding the third BMD site [in 
Europe].  Among the potential compromise items would be: without prior approval from Russia, 
no further deployments.  No GBI in Europe until a threat emerges - and this does not cost 
anything for the U.S. since the GBI site will not be ready for a while.  From the Russian side 
there are some assurances here [primarily that the U.S. would consult with Russia before 
expanding its BMD footprint in Europe].   
 
Presentation – Russian speaker: Need to take into consideration the nature of the threat and the 
geography.  There is flexibility in providing mobile missile defense assets and this is an 
important consideration (signaling, cooperative, etc).  The JDEC MOU has been signed but it has 
not been implemented. If we use the [proposed] Czech center to route data to JDEC, this could 
make the U.S. “third site” a cooperative effort13.   Perhaps set-up one such center [for 
cooperative data sharing] in Moscow [unclear is this would be different from JDEC].  Could use 
experts from other countries as well.  What if invite representatives from Iran?  Yes, they would 
see things, but they would also be required to disclose things.  All nuclear states would be part of 
this Moscow center. Important part is how to lower motivation to possess nuclear weapons? If 
fail in first [to prevent possession], then how prevent in their use? 
 
Q&A 
Comment – Russian participant:  Regarding cooperation in BMD, there is a heavy Russian-
Ukrainian rocket that can put two satellites into low orbit in one lift [alluding to surveillance 
systems if a threat emerges].  My previous belief was that mid-ranged ballistic missiles without 
nuclear weapons are completely ineffective but using GPS, Galileo, etc, may now make them 
very accurate.  A usual missile can now be turned into a high-precision ability to strike [civilian] 
nuclear sites.   
 
Panel 5: Nuclear Attribution and Response 
Presentation – U.S. speaker: “Nuclear Forensics and Attribution” 
• Nuclear forensics is the use of isotope ratios and other physical and chemical properties 
to help determine the age, origin, and history of nuclear materials and the design of 
nuclear devices 
• Attribution is the integration of all information, including law enforcement and 
intelligence data, to suggest or exclude the origin of nuclear materials and devices, routes 
of transit, and responsible groups or individuals  
 
Nuclear forensics: 
• Many of nuclear forensic techniques were developed during the Cold War to determine 
the characteristics of nuclear explosions carried out by the U.S., Russia, and other 
countries 
                                                
13 Do not believe he is endorsing the third site but rather highlighting a potential cooperative measure to consider if 
the U.S. continues to push forward with the Poland and Czech sites. 
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• In the past 15 years much work has been done at U.S. national laboratories to adapt 
existing techniques and develop new ones to identify intercepted nuclear materials 
• Nuclear forensics techniques are widely used in geosciences, planetary science, nuclear 
engineering, and nuclear medicine.  People with expertise in other fields. 
 
Possible goals of nuclear forensics: 
• To identify those responsible for nuclear theft or nuclear terrorism 
• Deter the theft of nuclear materials or acts of nuclear terrorism (not so optimistic about 
deterrence) 
• Encourage enhanced protection, control, and accounting for nuclear materials and 
weapons 
• Prevent additional thefts or terrorist acts by plugging leaks and tracking down other 
missing materials or devices.  Once identified; stop leak – after bomb detonated 
 
Possible applications of nuclear forensics: 
• Intercepted nuclear materials or devices 
• Relatively little time pressure (depending on size if large amount of material) 
• Benign environment 
• Detailed analysis of undisturbed nuclear and non-nuclear signatures possible 
• Debris from a nuclear explosion 
• Extreme time pressure 
• Highly radioactive environment; complicates response/recovery 
• Information lost or obscured in explosion 
• Debris from a radiological dispersal device; weapon of mass distraction, not WMD 
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Most of the increase listed since 1996 is due to improved reporting, not necessarily an increase in 
trafficking.  But there are sixteen reported intercepts of Pu and HEU, though relatively small 
quantities.  No case of Pu HEU interception had enough material to build a nuclear weapon.  
However, I am worried because our experience with the trafficking of drugs shows that we 
intercept only about 10% of the activity.  Also in most of these sixteen cases, the smugglers were 
terribly inept [and caught because of their failings, not the robustness or excellence of the 
counter-trafficking system]. 
 
16 Reported Intercepts of Pu/HEU
 
 
Typical sequence of events during a nuclear intercept: 
• Any explosive is rendered harmless 
• Chain of custody procedures are applied 
• Objects for forensics analysis are sent to one or more accredited nuclear forensics 
laboratory 
• Forensics analysis is iterative (successive steps depend on interim results); the Model 
Action Plan (MAP) adopted by the IAEA provides a useful guide 
 
Tools for Forensics Analysis: 
• Bulk analysis tools characterize the elemental and isotopic composition of the radioactive 
material as a whole, including trace elements 
• High magnification imaging tools (SEM) can characterize solid surfaces and powders 
• Microanalysis tools can detect trace surface contaminants or determine the composition 
of thin layers or surface coatings 
 
Types of information: 
• Possible source: weapon or weapon material storage, industry, hospital, research, etc. 
• Date of last chemical separation 
• Processing history (chemical processing, cladding/coatings, tools used, etc.) 
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Nuclear forensics works in tandem with non-nuclear forensic methods to determine likely sample 
origin and history. 
 
Post-detonation forensics: 
• In a nuclear explosion, nuclear and other weapon materials are converted into a plasma; 
debris collected is a condensation of this hot plasma 
• Some debris is in the crater; some is thrown into the air and condenses on particles of 
dust that fall back to the ground downwind (fallout); some remains suspended 
• At early times, the crater is too radioactive to access; collection will be from fallout and 
from the cloud 
• Multiple collections are essential due to fractionation 
• Analysis of nuclear materials, device design and efficiency possible; analysis that 
depends on shape, contaminants or trace materials not feasible 
Post-detonation Forensics
lab analysesweeks to monthsmaterial age production method
calculations based on 
lab analysesweeks to monthsdevice design
gamma-ray spectral 
analysishours to days










Need for international cooperation: 
• U.S. capacity is limited 
• skilled personnel at national labs may be double or triple booked in a nuclear 
emergency (forensics, NEST teams, response and recovery assistance) 
• lab capability has decreased markedly since 1990; pipeline to replace aging lab 
personnel is nearly empty 
• budgets are limited 
 
• Joint research opportunities 
• Rapid, accurate, safe capability to gather samples, make field measurements, 
maintain chain of custody 
• Automated portable instrumentation for accurate short-time analysis of all 
isotopes of interest, fitted into systems that can be deployed to the field 
• Automated laboratory equipment to analyze the full spectrum of nuclear materials 
 
• International cooperation can enhance capability and credibility of nuclear forensics and 
attribution 
• Strengthens deterrence (if forensics has any affect in this area) 
• Assists in prevention, efforts to improve MPC&A 
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• Legitimizes punishment of those responsible 
• Lack of cooperation may highlight suspect states 
 
 
• Intercepts of nuclear material have occurred in many countries; nuclear terrorism could 
occur anywhere 
• In the case of an explosion, debris will travel around the world and be analyzed by many 
laboratories in many countries; formal modes of cooperation and coordination should be 
worked out in advance 
 
• Calculated signatures, NTM are of limited utility. 
• for plutonium, can differentiate between broad types of reactors 
• for HEU, can differentiate between use of natural and reprocessed uranium 
• with age, can only rule out certain sources and suggest possible origins 
• Actual signatures are far more detailed, but require comprehensive international 




• The composition of samples of plutonium, HEU and other fissile materials, as well as 
indexed records of nuclear material properties, production locations, and use histories 
• Databases provide the means of comparison between intercepted nuclear materials or 
debris from a nuclear explosion and possible sources and production histories of the 
nuclear materials 
 
• Small databases exist in Europe, but they are not designed for rapid forensics response 
• IAEA 
• Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe 
• NEA Spent Fuel Isotopic Composition Database 
• Databases exist in several USG agencies 
• DOE maintains a database to provide information about DOE-owned/managed 
spent nuclear fuel 
• These databases are valuable but limited and are subject to non-disclosure agreements 
 
• The ideal database would include: 
• all relevant nuclear material information  
• vetted analytic processes to link information obtained from debris and intercepts 
to the database information  
• material production and processing information 
• information on material storage sites (types and quantities of materials and site 
security measures) 
• The database would be so managed to: 
• allow full prompt access in case of an emergency anywhere in the world 
• protect national and commercial secrets 
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Sample Banks 
• Databases should be supplemented by sample banks 
• to permit re-measuring a sample when the first analyses point to an unexpected 
possibility 
• to make better measurements when better techniques become available 
• Sample archives exist at some labs and at the IAEA but they are not complete enough to 
be useful in forensics 
 
An International Convention?  Some would not agree on this due to liability issues. 
• Similar to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; parties would 
• deposit nuclear materials data and samples according to agreed standards 
• assume responsibility for the consequences of theft or misuse of their nuclear 
materials 
• be eligible for compensation if they are victims of theft or misuse 
This convention would make clear that military response is not a legitimate response if theft or 
lost rather than deliberate effort. 
 
Q&A 
Question – U.S. participant: Under GI (the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism) there 
is a working group looking at the issue of attribution and forensics [this is a law enforcement and 
intelligence group that has had six meetings as of this date].  Maybe they can do an exercise? 
 
 
Dr. Sergei Rogov stands to make a point as (left to right) Dr. Lew Dunn, Gen. Bill Burns. MajGen Vladimir 
Dvorkin, and Col. Joe Hogler listen. 
 
Regarding the Joint Nuclear Emergency and Response capability, non-nuclear weapon states are 
not suppose to know how to render-safe a nuclear device, so if an event happens anywhere 
around the globe, how do we help?  If only a few states have this unique knowledge, how do we 
help/cooperate if a nuclear device is discovered on the territory of a non-nuclear weapon state?  
Perhaps an on-call NEST-like capability at the international level?  My guess is that the French, 
UK and possibly Russia would be interested, but probably not China. 
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Comment – U.S. participant: Pakistan uses the phrase “trust deficit” when referring to U.S. 
discussions (primarily in the media) about seizing Pakistani nuclear devices during an internal 
Pakistani crisis because the U.S. fears that Pakistan does not have adequate safeguards and locks 
on their weapons.  Pulonium-210 is another recent example in which cooperation did not occur. 
 
Question – U.S. participant:  One question I have not heard raised is what happens if the device 
uses material from more than one source? 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  Post-explosion forensics is very difficult because of the limited 
availability of material.  People were saying forensics provides a deterrent value but maybe this 
is not true if there is not a true technical capability [i.e. the smoking gun might not be available 
from a technical perspective]. 
 
Question – U.S. participant:  If you cannot tell where it came from, how readily do you know 
that you don’t know where it came from? 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  There is some discussion on blending nuclear materials from various 
sources in order to limit the likelihood of attribution.  Even blending things together does not 
always work.  Spoofing or obscuring a signature is not easy either and it could be reconstructed.  
This requires time and requires samples, but it is technically possible. 
 
Question – Russian participant:  Are there any tangible achievements with regards to attribution?  
Any tangible success stories that can be shared? 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  Earlier I showed sixteen cases of trafficking in Pu and HEU.  In several 
cases, analysis was done by U.S. labs and in several cases the SNM was attributed to a specific 
foreign laboratory.  Evidence was presented to these labs through diplomatic channels but then 
no response was received.  These cases probably demonstrate success in attribution but a failure 
of international cooperation in that punishment was not known to occur against these labs for 
knowingly or unknowingly allowing their SNM to be removed from their facilities. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant:  There is a success story in US-Russian cooperation regarding 
nuclear forensics.  It was conducted through the US-Russian counter-terrorism working group 
and involved the Bulgaria seizure.  LLNL did analysis for the IAEA and published its findings.  
It was thought to be worthwhile to also have the Russian side analyze the seizure and a sample 
was provided.  The Russian analysis noticed things in the sample that our lab did not notice.  So 
some value was clearly shown in sharing and comparing our forensics and results.  The negative 
side of this collaboration was that it took almost a year to get the paperwork in place and 
authorization to ship the sample to the Russian laboratory.  Then on the shipment date, the pilot 
of the airliner noticed that there was a radioactive sample manifested for the flight and he refused 
to transport it.  The U.S. was able to finally transport the sample on a different flight a few days 
later.   
 
Comment – U.S. speaker:  It’s also important to consider database testing.  There is some 
concern involving the protection of information in both security and commercial [proprietary] 
senses. We have discussed the use of encryption and/or a digest in which information is only 
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provided if it matches the sample.  But the database cannot be queried to randomly access 
information on specific facilities.  This could be a joint US-Russian project to develop such a 
software tool and to develop the protocol on how to deposit samples and protect the composition 
of claddings and coatings.  
 
Question – U.S. participant: What is the mechanism for satisfying national lab capabilities vice 
international capabilities and requirements? 
 
Answer – U.S. speaker:  The IAEA has a small analytical capability but it would like to have a 
robust capability and not have to rely on national labs. 
 
DAY TWO 
Panel 6: Strategic Relations 2008 and Beyond  
Opening comments – U.S. chair: Russia and the United States have a joint role in international 
leadership and responsibilities as custodians of most of the world’s nuclear weapons.  There is a 
lack of structure in place now for discussing these joint roles.  With an increase in trade and 
economic dialogue, perhaps we will see an incentive for Russian cooperation due to international 
pressures. 
 
Presentation – U.S. speaker: “Cooperative Security Management.”   
State of play 
- Downward slide in US-Russian relations 
- Military gamesmanship 
- Political and military tensions 
- Real differences of interest 
- Domestic politics are a factor 
- Failure of U.S. reliance on Adam Smith’s hidden hand – general lack of structure 
- Lack of sustainable, institutional windows that give each side insight on the thinking of 
the other side 
- This lack of understanding cuts both ways 
 
Make an assertion 
- Not in the interest of each side to have this downward slide 
 
Set out an approach 
- Emphasize trying to “step back” in order to put in a new approach 
- Principle is that both sides have an interest in cooperatively managing their relationship  
- Variety of means; finding and tapping into whole new ways of managing the relationship   
- Shared understandings or at least understand how we differ 
- From the grand to the nitty-gritty 
 
Specific actions – Three potential pathways… 
Pathway Number 1:  The two governments decide to try sometime in 2008 to rewind the movie 
and start the strategic relationship again 
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- Why would this happen?  Perhaps due to politics.  President Bush will be looking for a 
legacy and he doesn’t want it to be Iraq.  The Republican candidate for president is also 
going to be pushing for some type of foreign policy success from the current 
administration. 
- Could affirm the cooperative nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship.  Perhaps by 
providing a grand signal, such as a commitment to the follow-on of START.  
Specifics: 
- Renewed efforts to make JDEC a reality.  Why?  It’s a good symbolic step and provides a 
method to deal with one route of Russian strategic uncertainty. 
- Send a strong signal to Iran that if it drops out of the NPT, the U.S. and Russia will join 
efforts to ensure Iran does not gain from going nuclear.  A joint statement or even 
fielding a joint BMD system against Iran’s existing capabilities using existing U.S. and 
Russian BMD systems. 
- The two presidents can task their defense ministers to come back in three months with a 
“strategic uncertainties” work program.  Can provide guidance on the future role of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear emergency response, and the options for further relaxation of 
nuclear postures.  The defense ministers shall answer these issues, not FAS or other 
outside organizations. 
- Mutual liaison postings.  Russian officers to U.S. military sites.  Where would it be useful 
to have these postings? 
 
Pathway Number 2:  Continue the current drift until 2009, then the new presidents will initiate a 
new relationship. Basically equates to treading water until 2009.  Outsiders will do sustained and 
serious analysis of issues and options. Moreover, joint outsiders working together will keep the 
dialogue moving forward. 
 
Pathway Number 3:  We just keep drifting downwards…. 
 
Presentation – Russian speaker:  Here are my ideas on the big picture in US-Russian relations: 
 
New multi-polarity and how it differs: the first 200 years of the U.S.-Russian relationship. 
- For the first 150 years, we were allies or quasi allies.  WWII was a high point despite 
Stalin and our ideological differences 
- Then a bipolar environment during the Cold War but we were partners in MAD 
- The end of the Cold War saw a unipolar moment when our presidents declared strategic 
partnership, but just declared and also a lack of symmetry, so the U.S. moved unilaterally 
- Now we are moving back to a multi-polar system, and historically we have never been 
enemies in a multi-polar world…. 
 
From MAD to Mutual Assured Security (MAS): main components 
Emphasis is on political / military cooperation rather than science and technological cooperation 
1. We need a legal base.  Except for Israel, the U.S. has mutual security treaties or 
cooperative security treaties with all of its allies. 
2. Institutionalized relationship: can’t rely on our presidents looking into each other’s eyes. 
3. Economic ties: this has worked with China.  There is no economic stabilizing factor in 
US-Russian relations and it will not grow over night. 
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4. MAS: here there is an opportunity to move quickly.  There is a very small window of 
opportunity.  The successor to President Bush is not going to do anything major right 
when he/she comes into office.  Issues of democracy and human rights are an area where 
we have serious issues between Russia and the US.  But I don’t want to promise 
something that I cannot deliver. 
 
Here is my offer which I hope you will not be able to refuse. Cold War relations existed at five 
levels: 
1. ABM treaty (trend: dead) 
2. SALT / START (ends in 2009) 
3. INF (status TBD)  
4. Tactical Nuclear weapons / PNI 
5. CFE (should end 12 Dec. 2007h) 
 
By 2010 when the NPT review conference meets, no arms control treaty will be in place. We 
need to modernize the arms control regime; just preserving the old one is self-defeating.  
We can jointly deploy our existing systems to meet BMD needs (S-300/400, PAC-3, Arrow, 
Aegis, etc.) by 2009.  Southern Europe, Turkey, Greece, etc. would be protected.  This type of 
arrangement is also a quasi alliance against Iran.  The original plan for U.S. BMD was 200 
interceptors in two sites, this was then reduced to 100 in three sites, now by 2012 it will be 44 
interceptors in three sites.  If the U.S. agrees to this effort to use existing systems, then joint 
assessments using the Gabala radar and the detection of an Iranian 3-stage capability would 
indicate that Poland would be a necessary site [for GBIs]. 
   
Secretary Gates recognizes this importance of waiting for truth and is delaying the deployment of 
interceptors - or he’s in no rush because the sites have not even been approved or built yet. 
 
Until Dec. 31, 2012, do not need to do anything as we’ll be covered under the existing regime. 
   
Nuclear posture is the key thing as is involves further reductions and restructuring the strategic 
arsenals.  INF – what if we allow 100 conventional missiles; this was Gorbachev’s position 
before he agreed to zero.  There is a very strong desire in Russia to have intermediate range 
capability (two-stage Topol, cruise missiles, etc.).  The U.S. will be deploying a two-stage GBI 
in Poland rather than a 3-stage missile and this is a violation of the INF treaty according to some 
Russian interpretations.  Having one-hundred conventional missiles [intermediate range] allows 
us to keep our nuclear virginity. 
 
Regarding the tactical nuclear weapon concerns voiced earlier; this is not understood by Russia 
because our tactical nuclear weapons are all stored in Russia (on Russian territory) while the 
U.S. has a few hundred deployed in Europe.  And when we look at the Russian-Chinese border, 
we love tactical nuclear weapons…. 
 
Maybe a CFE-2 agreement is possible if NATO loosens its air routes/zones and the restrictions 
on where Russian military planes can operate.  Also some Russian military interest in global 
strike and the concept of conventional ICBMs or MRBMs.  So the allowance of one-hundred 
conventional missiles under INF may pave the way for some of these future capabilities by both 
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countries.  If look at all of these elements, some are modernized versions of arms control but 
really they are arrangements that cover all five layers of these previous Cold War agreements. 
 
Presentation – Russian speaker: 
In light of the previous three talks, I will focus on two issues: ABM and SRBM/MRBM. 
In order to reduce Russia’s concerns regarding the third BM site in Europe, if we look at the area 
where you seek to install new interceptors, and make this a European rather than an American 
system - with maybe a joint data center in Brussels – this would reduce concerns that the 
interceptors are being used to counter Russian ballistic missiles.  We heard that the U.S. is going 
to reduce the third-stage and go to a two-stage GBI. The first step should be the implementation 
of the 2000 JDEC MOU to initiate trust on both sides; then a similar center can be set-up in 
Brussels as a European-wide JDEC. 
 
As for the INF Treaty, it’s not a secret that Russia is less concerned with the West than it is with 
the East on MRBM issues.  Relations with China are good today but China has not given up 
territorial claims against Russia.  And in conventional arms and troops, China has an advantage 
in the east.  In addition, their medium range ballistic missiles all have ranges of 2,000-2,500km.  
Who are these targeted against?  It cannot continue like this for Russia with an imbalance in the 
Far East. 
 
My colleague recommends new treaty arrangements. Or perhaps we can elevate the “lower 
plank”: not 500-1,500 warheads but perhaps 1,500-5,000?  It’s also not a secret that Russia seeks 
Iskander and cruise missiles that can fly over 1,000km14.  Let’s consider the one-hundred 
conventional, intermediate range missiles mentioned earlier; maybe Russia takes it upon itself to 
put them not in the European part of Russia but in the Eastern part.  
 
We cannot make the mistake we made when the U.S. renounced the 1972 ABM treaty.  At the 
time Russia was not concerned but it was a mistake.  We could have adjusted the ABM to meet 
U.S. interests but the MFA did not allow us to seek compromises and to make this treaty possible 
in its adapted form.  Arms control is not static and has to adjust to existing realities.  Otherwise it 
will crumble like the ABM treaty and I’m very worried that the INF will follow in the same 
path15.  North Korea is also a concern and a potential party to a global INF treaty.  No one else 
can really join this because even if they give up their nuclear capabilities, may still be 
trading/selling nuclear expertise and technology. 
                                                
14 It’s unclear if the speaker is saying that Russia is seeking an extended-range version of the Iskander since the 
current version of the SS-26 is believed to have less than the 500km range limit of the INF Treaty. 
15 Rather than completely abandoning the INF treaty, the speaker seems to suggest that the U.S. and Russia should 
work together to reach a compromise and modify the treaty to allow Russia to have approximately 100 
conventionally-armed MRBM with the understanding that these missiles would be deployed to eastern Russia to 
address concerns over China. 
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George Fedoroff (far left) and Michael Keifer (center) listen to comments from David Hamon (right). 
 
Panel: What is to be done? 
Comment – U.S. participant: Have a very specific recommendation.  Several months ago I made 
this recommendation at a meeting in DC and it was met with resounding silence.  During WWII, 
the U.S. and UK set-up a joint military staff in DC that served as a focal point on military topics 
and provided quasi liaison between the two defense industries.  Seems to me that the time is right 
for a US-Russian staff of some sort at some place that is by definition non-political but able to 
address the issues discussed today. Would not be very large but would be headed by a senior 
general from both sides.  Communications being what they are today, the location of where this 
staff is based is not important. Focus is cooperation between the sides, to include the BMD area. 
Staff would have no executive authority but would be a consultative effort that addresses irritants 
that exist at lower levels but which often evolve into irritants at higher levels. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: Since the Cold War ended, I have been part of the teams that 
have worked on developing these types of recommendations.  The mechanism of “two-by-two” 
meetings have not been very effective16.  Sometimes it happens that the U.S. and Russia hug 
when something horrible happens (Hitler, 9/11, etc).  One point of contention is the situation 
with BMD in Europe.  At the same type we remember plans for lasers on a Boeing 747 
[airborne-laser system] and potential weapons in space – there have been such activities as you 
know17.  We’re witnessing a period where not a blatant confrontation exists between our 
countries but also not good relations.  We need a more proactive effort at cooperation.  I think we 
can jointly defend against Iran.  Iran may want to possess nuclear weapons just because of the 
United States.   
Why can we not think of a scenario where we are not considering a non-nuclear Iran. I have a 
certain confidence that no later than May of next year our positions regarding Iran will converge.  
I think this because Russia has worked a lot to make Iran accept some of its proposals with 
limited or no success.  Our political leadership has practically exhausted its leverage with Iran.  
 
                                                
16 This is a reference to having the Secretaries of State and Defense meet jointly with the Russian Ministers of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs. 
17 The speaker’s point is that, from the Russian perspective, BMD interests in Europe do not represent the only 
expansion of potential anti-ballistic missile activities and interests by the United States. 
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Yes, domestic politics in Iran is a very complex issue and let’s assume that we’ll be able to put 
the nuclear ambitions of Iran to rest.  The positions of the IAEA and others are coming closer to 
agreement on Iran.  I think we need to not only get rid of Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also its 
missile capability.  This comes back to BMD as we may need to counter an Iranian threat or even 
a threat from someone else.  This need for BMD cooperation is less tactical and more strategic in 
nature. 
 
The most powerful effect of BMD systems is the ability to strike the launch sites.  When North 
Korea declared its capabilities, the immediate comment by Dr. William Perry was that we need 
to strike North Korea’s launch sites - this coming from a very peaceful man18.   Sen. Lugar’s 
rebuttal was not to strike yet but use diplomacy first. 
 
It’s not about democracy in the Russian Federation but about democratizing.  Former 
Ambassador Kennan wrote that when Russia gets rid of the Bolsheviks, not a single decade will 
come by before Russia is ready to embrace democracy [meaning it will take decades, not a few 
years after communism ends in Russia before democracy really takes root].    
 
Question – U.S. participant:  Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian speaker said that 
they are all at central storage sites in Russia.  Is there a possibility to verify this in relation to the 
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe?  You said “what is the threat?” - We look at loose 
nukes as the threat/concern. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: I think the subject of loose nuclear weapons in Russia is grossly 
overstated.  I don’t blame Graham Allison for using this issue because it helped to raise 
awareness of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.  Loose nuclear weapons are more of a 
Pakistani issue - and sometimes a U.S. Air Force issue19….  How well and why we verify 
nuclear weapons is more based on delivery vehicles. 
 
We are still very unhappy that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe.  However, I 
think it is counterproductive perhaps if the U.S. withdrawals all of its tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe since some European countries may change their minds on not having them. A 
confidential exchange of information regarding the status of U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear 
weapons is possible.  I raised this issue with DOE officials a few years ago that the U.S. should 
make this proposal but it never came from your side because it was not in your interest20.    
It seems to me that a Russia military cell in the Joint Chiefs is possible, but having U.S. military 
“spies” in the General Staff is a tough sell today; maybe at SHAPE for regular discussions and 
exchanges?  The Russian-NATO council has prepared good working documents but there is no 
political will to take these forward.  They include a blueprint for joint Russian-NATO BMD 
defenses.  A military cell in DC as a permanent staff to support the two-by-two format is a 
possibility.   
                                                
18 This incident occurred in July 2006, before North Korea detonated a nuclear device, when they were planning to 
test a long-range ICBM capable of reaching the continental United States. 
19 The speaker is referring to the 30 August 2007 incident of six nuclear-armed cruise missiles being inadvertently 
flown on a B-52 from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB. 
20 Note that the speaker emphasized that a recommendation for confidential information exchange on tactical nuclear 
weapon status would have to come from the United States as various factors in the Russian bureaucracy would 
prevent the Russian-side from proposing such an initiative. 
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Secretary Gates was the Director of the CIA when the INF was signed; his counterpart was 
selling furniture in Leningrad at that time so they are not at equal levels regarding their 
understanding of U.S.-Russian relations.  As far as responsible individuals, we had in June 2005 
an interesting game on BMD and third-party threats21.  Maybe we can organize something 
similar next spring – it was an interesting game.  We can immediately use Russian staff 
documents as a blueprint.  Iran launches against Italy, Russia and Israel.  Then we discuss what 
we will do.  This will help the previous comments on cooperative security management sound 
kosher. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: I do not see such a need for cooperation in tactical nuclear 
weapons.  There has been no such practice that we would know of or could use.  But confidential 
classified discussions between our countries is possible [he means that a verification regime on 
tactical nuclear weapon storage/security is not possible but that confidential bilateral dialogue in 
which data and information is exchanged is possible].  One U.S. general [Habiger, former CinC 
STRAT] was granted access to a Russian nuclear stockpile depot and not only looked at the 
portal but was also granted access to the actual storage area.  There is no need for verification if 
there is an exchange of information on where and what is stored22.  
 
Comment – Russian participant:  A month ago in San Francisco we prepared a significant 
amount of materials on non-strategic nuclear weapons [he is referring to his participation in a 
conference at the Hoover Institution, Stanford on 24-25 October 2007].  Having a military liaison 
is very important but small steps such as JDEC must come first.  President Putin has come back 
to this idea of JDEC with the discussions on European BMD, use of the Gabala radar, etc.  We 
lost this opportunity but we can go back to 1998 and 2000.  There was no provision for real-time 
information exchange in the original JDEC MOU so maybe the U.S. can revisit this proposal 
with real-time data exchange included.  We proposed having the JDEC in the Ural Mountains but 
the U.S. said no go; it’s hard to bring groceries to our troops [he is making a joke about an earlier 
U.S. comment about having the Russian military cell stationed in Alaska rather than DC].  In 
Russia there are a whole host of troubles in revisiting the JDEC proposal, so the initiative has to 
come from the U.S. side23.  
 
Comment – Russian participant: Maybe an American proposal to have two centers in Omaha and 
Moscow and two cells in DC and in Moscow.  We can provide two sets of rules that cover the 
centers and the cells. 
 
                                                
21 Referring to the ASCO-sponsored tabletop exercise held in Monterey and Omaha with various Russian, U.S. 
interagency and STRATCOM representatives. 
22 Tactical nuclear weapons in some detail in the 2005 article “The Truth about ‘Suitcase Nukes,’” Yaderny Kontrol 
Digest, Vol. 10, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2005).  Another article in the same publication refers to the Habiger visit; 
see Vladimir Verkhovtsev, “Nuclear Weapons Security – Russia’s Top Priority in the Long Term.” 
23 This is a continuing theme over the two days of discussions; there are important initiatives that need to be moved 
forward but the initial outreach must come from the U.S.-side. 
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Wrap-up Session: “What is to be done” 
Presentation on some of the key issues from the two days of discussions:  
 
Guiding Principles 
• Taking small, deliberate steps may be the most appropriate path to success 
• “Perceptions and Misperceptions” the overriding theme of the last two days. 
 
Perceptions and Misperceptions 
• US-Russian cooperation is occurring! 
– CTR (i.e. BTRP, Kola Center, etc) 
– Reduction in nuclear arsenals 
– Global initiative to combat nuclear terror 
– Global nuclear energy partnership 
– …and many more efforts not in the public limelight. 
• Terminology and Concepts 
– Capabilities-based planning 
• Russian translation is “to develop maximum capabilities in every area” 
– Alert posture (“de-alert” and “hair-trigger”) 
– Launch / use authorities (and rationale) 
– Deterrence (and what deters in 21st century) 
– Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) 
– Global strike, tactical nuclear weapons 
– and many more… 
– Standardizing terminology and concepts can also help with internal discussions 
within the interagency since there is confusion here as well  
• New rules of the game 
– What replaces formal structure and dialogue previously provide in arms control? 
– How guide China, India and other states in their interactions on nuclear issues? 
• NPT Article 6 
– Are the commitments / obligations of Article 6 being met in a less formal and 
visible manner? 
– Does an emphasis on nuclear weapons in national strategies/doctrines undermine 
NPT obligations? 
– Update rules and guidelines of regimes and agreements supporting the NPT 
• Common threats and concerns? 
– Terrorism? 
– Actions by states such as Iran and North Korea? 
• BMD 
– Third-site technical and operational considerations for the U.S. and Russian 
– Regional BMD considerations / options 
– Information exchange requirements 
– Joint assessments and studies 
 
International Leadership 
• Nuclear forensics and attribution 
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• Establishing new rules of the game 
• Anticipating next “Proliferation Shock” 
• Enhance security culture around world 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: ASCO has sponsored these events since 2002.  Their interest is in 
being the architectural team and coaching these track-II efforts to have issues implemented.  
Please confine your materials and comments to what was just presented and whether anything 
was missed. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: Would add that as we are thinking through these topics, please 
consider what are the mechanisms for action and how can we fashion them so they have an 
impact? 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: Regarding the area of biology, we have a current report from the 
NAS with specific recommendations regarding infectious disease monitoring.  It would be 
helpful to have some type of joint workshop to explore these recommendations but who on the 
Russian side would be at the table [i.e. who should be invited] to discuss infectious disease 
monitoring.  While this is a $200M effort, we are trending towards zero in Russia because much 
of this work is now taking place outside Russia.   
 
Comment – Russian participant: I wasn’t able to say certain things during the break so here they 
are.  Regarding information systems and command and control – What happens if there is no 
nuclear threat from Iran?  Seems like the nucleus in this BMD system versus Iran needs to be an 
information system that makes good decisions based on movements, etc.  So the first step is 
establishing an information center.  Should probably be regional and can even go beyond missile 
defense, such as joint threat analysis.   
- Content – what type of information is gathered and how is it analyzed? 
- Technical – how do we develop this system for information sharing and joint analysis? 
So would add to the summary slides an informational component that includes space; 
“cooperation in information technology” as this is a critical area 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: I come back to where we started; seems to me that two types of 
ideas are put forward for action 
1. Issues and activities that are going to be resolved (or not) by the two countries (joint 
BMD, bringing JDEC to life, etc) – somebody else is going to make a decision about this 
issues but ASCO and CISAC can push forward recommendations. 
2. Concepts, Approach, Ways of Doing Business between the U.S. and Russia.  Time is 
coming but hasn’t yet arrived – going beyond traditional transparency measures.  “We 
will invite the Chief of the General Staff to the U.S.”  “We will have certain verification 
measures,” etc.  Anything to get into the mind of the other military.  Can be done by 
outside organizations and over time.  CISAC and ASCO have roles here. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant:  One topic that did come up was how to revive lab-to-lab 
cooperation.  Lab relationships were so deep and productive in the early 1990s but now so tightly 
governed that this exchange has lost its creativity. 
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Comment – Russian participant:  While participating in CISAC meetings lately, I have not been 
very comfortable because the discussions have been very technical and I am not familiar with 
many of the technical details of the topics.  All very important, but not my area of knowledge – 
spent fuel, biology, nuclear terrorism, Nunn-Lugar, etc…. 
 
Seems to me, without downgrading the agenda of CISAC and without eliminating the important 
exchanges on technical issues, I would recommend a more political-military agenda for the 
upcoming meetings, not scientific-technical.  These would fall into six specific areas or six 
baskets: 
1. Conceptualizing the Russian-American relationship.  Mutual assured security (not my 
original idea but put forward in 1991 by Bill Perry and John Steinbrunner) or cooperative 
security management.  But we also need a legal base – some type of formal agreement.  
Even Pakistan received some status as a non-NATO ally.  Concerning democracy and 
human rights, there is a perception or misperception in Russia that the U.S. is meddling in 
Russian elections.  Of course, the U.S. is the only country that elects through aristocracy 
[referring to the electoral college and the 2000 Bush-Gore election]. 
2. Ballistic missile defense: joint or cooperative defenses.  This would be a departure from 
traditional arms control but also includes a hidden form of arms control since the U.S. 
would not deploy in Poland [he means that if a joint system is developed, it would 
probably not involve the GBI site in Poland and so, from the Russian perspective, this 
would be a pseudo arms control measure over the stated U.S. intent to deploy GBIs in 
Poland].  Joint BMD requires technical analysis and this is an area for cooperation.  The 
North Korean problem has also not been resolved [i.e. the focus of joint BMD would not 
just by Iran]. 
3. A discussion on hair-trigger alert and de-alerting really changes the focus of the debate.  
I’m not former military but I know how targeting is done in the United States and Russia.  
There is still concern about the “bolt out of the blue” decapitating strike capability 
demonstrated by boat patrols.  A solution is to change the posture in a way.  “High alert” 
for a limited number of weapons (~500) that cover all targets in China and other 
countries but not enough for Russia.  “Medium alert” (days to weeks) such as bombers to 
bring weapons and bombers back together.  “Low alert” for nuclear weapons that require 
time to reassemble.  The United States would not be able to execute its entire target list 
immediately and this also allows the U.S. to signal to China or other actors by ramping 
up alert status in response to their actions. I am not saying zero alert ala Sam Nunn but 
only having some on high alert24. 
4. Discuss all Russian and American nuclear weapons.  All types – strategic and tactical.  
Arrange some type of information exchange or assurances. 
5. Engaging China and India as well as all official and non-official nuclear powers on the 
issue of stability.  So even if the U.S. and Russia reach stability, there are other guys 
around.  Only legally binding treaty right now is CFE and that is about to end.  Exchange 
of info about forces, about nuclear doctrine; sharing technology about PALs, warning, 
etc; and political statements not to build-up above existing levels – this would be difficult 
                                                
24 This concept of tiered alert statuses is described in Sergey Rogov, Victor Esin and Pavel Zolotarev, “Reducing 
Nuclear Tensions: How Russia and the United States Can Go Beyond Mutual Assured Destruction.” Institute of the 
United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences (19 January 2005). 
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to do with China and India.  Will take many years, but if we engage them and share this 
culture of strategic arms control, we will make progress.  Also needs to be reinforced by 
previous US-Russian declarations of a limited number of weapons on high alert.  An 
MOU between India and China is needed; India and Pakistan have several.  
6. INF plus one-hundred proposal that we previously discussed involving one-hundred 
conventionally armed medium range ballistic missiles that would most likely not be 
deployed in the European region of Russia but rather in the Far East.  
These are six baskets.  Not saying do all of them but maybe pick up two to three.  
 
Questions – U.S. participant: Of these six baskets, which are your leaders most likely to accept 
us doing?   Answer: The first three. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: While I listened to you, I was looking at the summary slide left up 
on the screen.  Some of us were talking about terminology and how so much of it relates to the 
Cold War.  In Vienna we discussed Common Threats; we should at least develop a deep 
understanding of how we view threats and how that might influence our actions.  There is a 
proposal to have a U.S.-Russian meeting that will also include China and India.  Perhaps it is 
worthwhile to include a very preliminary discussion about threats and perceptions. 
 
Comment – Russian participant:  The summary slides provide an exhaustive list of our 
discussions.  What is needed are potential tactics for implementing these findings.  Based on the 
last fifteen years, the only thing missing – even if there was a legal requirement – was political 
will.  If we conduct these studies and do not have political will, we will put the MoD and DoD in 
a bad position because we will make recommendations in conjunction with our military experts 
but then not have political support for these recommendations. If there is a presidential summit, 
then maybe insert our small steps/findings into the political agenda. Americans are always about 
verification.  When listened to the brief yesterday about why the U.S. has not ratified the CTBT, 
I came to the conclusion again that it’s all about verification [i.e. the U.S. desire/demand to have 
access]. 
 
Comment – Russian participant: I might have some funding to have a meeting in Moscow next 
March for six to eight U.S. experts to come over [note that this Russian offer to pay for the travel 
expenses of six to eight U.S. track-II participants is very unusual and a tremendous gesture].  We 
have a very narrow window of opportunity before Putin retires.  I do not think the next Russian 
president will do something so controversial as give in to American imperialism or work with a 
lame-duck president.  Next year we should prepare a menu of options for execution in 2009 and 
consider at least some of the baskets I proposed earlier. 
 
Comment – U.S. participant: If it’s in the area of strategic weapons and threat reduction, you can 
sign us up.   
 
 
End of Workshop 
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  Ms. Anne Harrington, Director, CISAC/NAS  
  Dr. Michael Wheeler, Director, ASCO/DTRA 
  Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director, Institute of USA and Canada, Moscow 
 
0930-1100 Panel 1: The Evolving U.S. and Russian Security Environments: Mutual 
Interests, Mutual Perceptions, and Pressing Challenges 
Presentations from the Vienna meeting of the NAS-RAS project on “Nuclear 
Security Environment in 2015.”  Objective is to define the challenges for this 
workshop by highlighting areas in which U.S. and Russian strategic interests are 
merging as the global security environment continues to change, areas of mutual 
misperception, and the continuing challenges of transforming the relationship to 
serve our mutual interests and minimize areas of disagreement. 
 
1100-1230 Panel 2: Threat Reduction in New Environments – Possibilities, Constraints, 
Ways Ahead 
Exploration of the evolution of CTR and other threat reduction activities to meet 
new challenges, to include the full range of WMD as well as possible joint efforts 
in other regions involving third parties.   
 
1230-1330 Buffet Lunch served in meeting room  
 
1330-1500 Panel 3: The Evolving Russian and American Strategic Postures 
Exploration of each side’s perception of the evolving strategic posture of the other 
side, with the goal of identifying misperceptions, clarifying issues, and fostering a 
discussion of specific actions to transform the strategic relationship.  
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1500-1630 Panel 4: Moving Beyond the U.S.-Russian Impasse on BMD: Opportunities and 
Options 
 
1630-1730 Panel 5: Nuclear Attribution and Response: Political, Operational and Technical 
Avenues for Cooperation: A U.S.-led discussion on observations and 
opportunities seen in recent bilateral efforts in this area.  Focus is primarily the 
political aspects involved in implementing the technical and operational measures 
for attribution and response. 
 
1730  End of Day One formal discussions 
1730  Reception  
1800  Dinner   
 
 
29 November 2007 (Thursday): CISAC/NAS; Washington, DC 
 
0900-1030 Panel 6: Strategic Relations 2008 and Beyond 
Exploration of each side’s assessment of the state of the U.S.-Russian strategic 
relationship, their vision for that relationship’s evolution, the impediments to its 
transformation toward a truly non-adversarial relationship, and of specific actions 
that might be taken to shape that evolving relationship in a mutually beneficial 
manner. 
 
1030-1200 Wrap-up / “What is to be Done” - review of the top issues raised over the 
previous day and specific recommendations for addressing these issues. 
- Mr. Jerry Conley, GWU, Ms. Anne Harrington, CISAC and Dr. Sergei Rogov 
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Appendix B: Workshop Participants 
 
U.S.-Russian Dialogue on Strategic Cooperation and Joint Crisis Management 
28-29 November 2007 / Keck Center / Room 201 
Workshop Participants 
 
1. Mr. Kirk Augustine, Political Advisor, USSTRATCOM  
2. Mr. Paul Bernstein, SAIC 
3. Amb. Linton Brooks 
4. Maj. Gen. William Burns 
5. Mr. Jerry Conley, ICDRM / GWU 
6. Dr. Lew Dunn, SAIC 
7. Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, SRF retired 
8. Mr. Robert Einhorn, CSIS  
9. Mr. George Fedoroff, US Navy 
10. Dr. Steven Fetter, Dean, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland 
11. Mr. David Hamon, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, DTRA 
12. Mr. Pat Harahan, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, DTRA 
13. Ms. Anne Harrington, CISAC, NAS 
14. Mr. Joe Hogler, HQ Air Force/A5XP 
15. Mr. David Huizenga, NNSA 
16. Dr. Kerry Kartchner, Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning, Office of Strategic Planning and 
Outreach, DoS 
17. Mr. Michael Keifer, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, DTRA 
18. Dr. Ed Levine, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Professional Staff 
19. Dr. George Look, Director, Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach, DoS  
20. Adm. Richard Mies, USN, retired 
21. Mr. Igor Nikolaev, Foundation for Military Reform (Russia) 
22. Dr. Sergei Rogov, ISKRAN 
23. Dr. Yevgheniy Rogovskiy, ISKRAN 
24. Mr. Ben Rusak, CISAC, NAS 
25. Mr. Adam Scheinmann, NNSA 
26. Mr. David Stein, OSD Policy  
27. Mr. Randy Strauss, USSTRATCOM/J51 
28. Dr. Misha Tsypkin (NPS) 
29. Mr. Andrew Weber, Advisor CTR Policy, OSD 
30. Dr. Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 
31. Dr. Michael Wheeler, Director, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, DTRA 
32. Col. Valery Yarynich, ISKRAN 
33. Col. Gen. Victor Yesin, SRF retired  
34. Maj. Gen. Pavel Zolotarev, ISKRAN 
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Appendix C: Workshop Read-Ahead Reference Materials 
 
 
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, “Leadership through Partnership: A Vision for the 2015 Security 
Relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation” (October 21, 
2007).  Paper presented at The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 workshop, 
Vienna, Austria, 12-13 November 2007. 
 
Lewis A. Dunn, “Cooperative Security Management:  Toward a New Approach for Managing 
the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship.” Draft paper dated 27 October 2007. 
 
Vladimir Dvorkin, “On Strategic Relations between Russia and the U.S.: An analysis of Mark 
Schneider's paper titled: ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation.’” 
(September 2006). 
 
Michael J. Kristo, “U.S. and Russian Collaboration in the Area of Nuclear Forensics.” Paper 
presented at The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 workshop, Vienna, Austria, 
12-13 November 2007. 
 
Lev Dmitrovich Ryabev, “Fundamental Principles of U.S.-Russian Cooperation in the Nuclear 
Field: A Review of Opportunities and Threats.” Paper presented at The Future of the Nuclear 
Security Environment in 2015 workshop, Vienna, Austria, 12-13 November 2007. 
 
Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation.” A Publication of 
the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, Washington, DC (2006). 
 
Richard Weitz, “Russian Nuclear Forces and Their Problems,” in Owen C.W. Price and Jenifer 
Mackby, eds, Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues (CSIS, Washington DC, 2007). 
 
 
Additional readings that came up during the workshop discussion: 
 
Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “Nuclear Deterrence and Non-Proliferation.” Carnegie-
Moscow (2006). 
 
Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “Revising Nuclear Deterrence.” Center for International 
and Security Studies (CISSM) at the University of Maryland (October 2005). 
 
Sergey Rogov, Victor Esin and Pavel Zolotarev, “Reducing Nuclear Tensions: How Russia and 
the United States Can Go Beyond Mutual Assured Destruction.” Institute of the United States 
and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences (19 January 2005). 
